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ABSTRACT 
Twenty-three years after its inception in 1991, NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance 
(AGS) program is nearly an operational reality. Though AGS is a significant 
accomplishment, the political, economic, and strategic concerns of individual Allies have 
tempered the pursuit of a more robust acquisition. AGS will provide an important 
capability advance for the Alliance, but it obviously cannot overcome all the systemic 
capability shortcomings that the Alliance’s Smart Defense (SD) initiative hopes to 
address. Given NATO’s struggles with AGS, its label as a “flagship” SD program may be 
undeserved—or illustrative of the challenges facing SD. While AGS appears to mirror 
the NATO AWACS acquisition, neither provides an ideal template for further SD 
programs. Instead, the successes and failures of AGS suggest an evolution in joint 
Alliance procurements. While focusing on efficiencies—a traditional SD ideal that is 
insufficient in isolation—AGS reinforces a more important principle in the Alliance: 
sustaining NATO’s political cohesion. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, NATO’s most prominent joint acquisition program is called Alliance 
Ground Surveillance (AGS).  First conceived in 1991, the program has weathered major 
political challenges, and it is now on track to be implemented in the 2015–2017 
timeframe.1 This thesis investigates the following questions: What is the history of AGS? 
What does AGS mean for NATO’s Smart Defense (SD) initiative? More deeply, what are 
the motivators behind the AGS program, and what are its prospects? To what extent can 
lessons from the AGS project contribute to smarter capability procurement in NATO? In 
short, this thesis examines the NATO AGS program and asks, what, why, and so what? 
AGS has been identified as a flagship SD program by Secretary General 
Rasmussen, who promotes SD as “ensuring greater security, for less money.”2 The Smart 
Defense (SD) initiative is widely perceived to be a useful concept for the NATO Allies 
that will promote efficiencies in military spending at a critical time for the Alliance. 
Influential leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have issued dire warnings about the future 
of the Alliance if SD does not become the new mindset. Left unsaid, however, is whether 
successfully implemented SD is enough to avoid these grim forecasts. 
Expected savings from SD programs are small in comparison to recent and 
expected defense budget reductions, and, despite much fanfare, SD initiatives have only 
registered limited commitments from member states. German scholar Michael Rühle 
asserts bluntly that better coordination “could potentially save European nations a few 
hundred million euros, yet the budget cuts since the beginning of the financial crisis in 
2008 amount to more than 30 billion euros.”3 While the implementation of SD has been 
flawed, the necessity for it has been genuine. Absent greater efficiencies through 
                                                 
1 “Alliance Ground Surveillance,” NATO, last updated April 15, 2013, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm.  
2 “Smart Defense and Interoperability,” NATO Multimedia Library, last modified October 21, 2013, 
http://natolibguides.info/smartdefence.  
3 Michael Ruhle, “The Future of the Transatlantic Security Relationship,” American Foreign Policy 
Interests 35, no. 5 (2013), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10803920.2013.836015#.Ummi7_lq_To, 1. 
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cooperation, shrinking national defense budgets and poorly coordinated procurement and 
maintenance will severely weaken member states and the alliance as a whole. A major 
theme in SD is cooperation in, among other things, the acquisition, maintenance, and 
operation of new military capabilities. This study focuses on the essential first step, 
formal Alliance acquisition of the AGS program.  
The successes and failures of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program 
offer important lessons about Smart Defense and NATO’s future ability to make major 
joint acquisitions. The Allies saw the advantages of U.S. E-8 Joint Surveillance and 
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft during the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and 
set a formal requirement for this capability in 1992. Three Supreme Allied Commanders 
Europe (SACEURs)—Generals George Joulwan, Wesley Clark, and Joseph Ralston—
made AGS their number one acquisition priority.  
AGS nonetheless remains a work in progress.4 Since 1992, the program has 
undergone significant revamping, changes in participating member states, and muted 
debates about its relevance and prospects. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated in 
October 2011 that “AGS is a crucial symbol of alliance collaboration…Unless it is 
implemented successfully, the drive for similar, cost-effective, multinational approaches 
to capability development would be seriously undermined.”5  
Heeding this sentiment, 14 of NATO’s 28 member states (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United States) resolved to fund AGS in May 2012.6 
Since then, events have transpired that threaten to complicate the acquisition process. A  
 
 
                                                 
4 The streak of AGS enjoying number one priority status seemingly ended with SACEUR General 
James Jones, whose statements embraced more diverse priorities. Pierre A. Chao, NATO AGS-Finally 
Ready to Fly (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004); “NATO Considers 
Merging AGS,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 8, 2001. 
5 U.S. Department of Defense, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta at Carnegie Europe, Brussels Belgium,” 
October 5, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4895. 
6 “Alliance Ground Surveillance.” 
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successful AGS program would be a much needed vote of confidence for NATO, but it is 
by no means assured, and its effectiveness as a flagship Smart Defense program is 
debatable. 
A. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
NATO is in an existential crisis.  Evolving security threats, differing national 
priorities, and shrinking defense budgets are tearing at the heart of the world’s most 
powerful and arguably most successful alliance. These seemingly insurmountable 
headwinds reveal divisions across the Alliance, yet the NATO Allies unequivocally 
express resolve to maintain unity. Such a dichotomy cannot last.  NATO must attend to 
its most critical fault lines; failing to do so may result in collapse when the Alliance 
experiences real pressure. In an attempt to address major shortcomings and preserve the 
Alliance’s capabilities and influence, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has in 
recent years raised the banner of Smart Defense, which sounds rich in promise, despite its 
conceptual vagueness. Acknowledging Europe’s flagging military ability and credibility, 
Rasmussen has argued that Smart Defense will “build greater security with fewer 
resources but more coordination and coherence.”7 
In theory, Smart Defense revolutionizes thinking about military capabilities 
acquisition, prioritizing military expenditures for the good of the alliance by developing 
specific capabilities on a multinational basis. Critics, however, “see Smart Defense as a 
new label for the old approach to capability development in the alliance or as a NATO 
rebranding of the EU’s concept of pooling and sharing.”8 These critics have much history 
to draw upon.  NATO first discussed the value of joint acquisitions—without calling it 
Smart Defense—in then-secret Strategic Concepts as early as 1949.9 For such an  
 
                                                 
7 “Building Security in an Age of Austerity: Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security Conference,” February 4, 2011, 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm. 
8 Lisa Aronsson and Molly O’Donnell, Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance 
Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century? The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, March 2012, 8, 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/userfiles/file/NATO/Conference_Report.pdf. 
9 NATO Standing Group, “Revised Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area,” 
November 19, 1949, 15, www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491119a.pdf. 
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endeavor to gain traction against an army of skeptics, it needs a success story as proof 
that the concept is viable. AGS seems to be the only current program capable of 
providing such evidence. 
During the Cold War, the NATO Allies proved themselves capable of such 
collective action, but 2014 is not 1978. The most prominent success story for what is 
currently termed Smart Defense was finalized in December 1978, when NATO’s 
“Defence Planning Committee signed a memorandum of understanding to buy and 
operate a NATO-owned AEW [Airborne Early Warning] system. By this decision, the 
member nations embarked on NATO’s largest commonly funded acquisition program.”10 
The NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) acquisition is today an 
ongoing success, but in its origins it shared many of the same problems as the AGS 
program today, most notably disagreements over technical data sharing and the division 
of benefits from domestic industries getting a piece of the deal or other “offsets.”11  
The post-Cold War political situation has exacerbated these issues. Absent a 
common threat as compelling as the Soviet Union, European governments have seen 
fewer convincing incentives to pay for NATO capabilities that do not directly benefit 
their own industries. Disagreements arising from this contention have greatly reduced the 
scale of the AGS program and with it the number of full participants. The initial concept 
of 12 modified A321s (European JSTARS) with the possibility of adding unmanned 
aerial vehicles  now stands finalized at zero A321s and five Global Hawks.12 NATO 
AWACS enjoyed full support from all Allies save Belgium, France, Iceland, and the 
U.K.13 Today, AGS enjoys the political support of all Allies, but only half have 
committed to the costly acquisition. 
                                                 
10 “NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force E-3A Component: The History,” 
http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/organizations/history.htm. 
11 R. D. M. Furlong, “Can NATO Afford AWACS?,” International Defense Review 5 (1975). 
12 “Last Best Chance for NATO Airborne Ground Surveillance,” International Defense Review, 
August 19, 2002, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=++
+1100546&Pubabbrev=IDR.  
13 Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress of the United States: Equitable 
Cost Sharing Questioned on NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Program (Washington, DC: 
United States General Accounting Office, 1980), 10.  
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The number of full AGS partners was formalized at 14 in 2012, down from 23 in 
2005 and 20 in 2008. Of the 26 Alliance members in 2005, only Hungary, Iceland, and 
the United Kingdom opted to not contribute to funding a €23 million study on AGS. By 
2009, Belgium, France, Greece, Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain 
opted out of the acquisition. By the time that the AGS contract was finally signed at the 
Chicago summit in May 2012, the consortium had regained Denmark, but lost Canada. 
Only 14 participants remained full AGS partners, though France and the UK had agreed 
to provide “in-kind” national assets to the ground surveillance mission. Even this final 
count continues to change. While Poland rejoined the program after the 2012 signing, the 
number appears unlikely to increase further given the current economic environment.14 
Following two decades of tribulations, AGS was presented as a major success 
story at the Chicago Summit in May 2012. A consortium within the Alliance finally 
committed to a $1.7 billion purchase of five Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft. NATO 
Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow said that the commitment “will move us 
from consultations to implementation, from an idea to a programme.”15 Still, the 
program’s success is by no means assured. Problems with the Global Hawk remain on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  
Three months before NATO settled on the purchase of Global Hawk Block 40 
aircraft, the U.S. Air Force attempted to terminate its Global Hawk Block 30 acquisition 
on the grounds that it “was underperforming, had busted its budget, and wasn’t vital to 
immediate combat needs.”16 By February 2013, Air Force officials in the Pentagon were 
strongly considering terminating the Block 40 variant, which was given a “50/50 chance 
                                                 
14 See Chapter II for a full description. “NATO commits to AGS, Delays Design Phase,” Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, April 29, 2005; Brooks Tigner, “AGS Wrangle on the Agenda as NATO Ministers Meet,” 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 12, 2008; “Alliance Ground Surveillance.”  
15 “NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Programme Takes off in Chicago,” May 20, 2012, 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_87544.htm. 
16 Richard H.P. Sia and Alexander Cohen, “The Drone that Wouldn’t Die: How a Defense Contractor 
Bested the Pentagon,” The Atlantic, July 16, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/07/the-drone-that-wouldnt-die-how-a-defense-contractor-
bested-the-pentagon/277807/. 
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of survival.”17 Although Northrop Grumman and national policy-makers have been 
influenced by the threat of the Global Hawk’s imminent retirement, the platform’s 
performance has improved recently. Since 2011–2013, and helped in part by high 
demand for its services in Afghanistan, the cost per-flight hour was reduced 50 percent, 
and the mission capable rate rose from an abysmal 55.2 percent to a low but more 
reasonable 74.1 percent.18 Alongside the impressive U.S. Navy acquisition of 68 MQ-4C 
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance “Triton” aircraft,19 U.S. Asian partners have 
expressed interest in acquiring the Global Hawk to improve their maritime capabilities as 
well. 
Across the Atlantic, the Global Hawk is having growing pains as well. In May 
2013, Germany completely cancelled its Euro Hawk program, which was to have been a 
sister program to NATO AGS.20 Even worse, the fallout from the Euro Hawk scandal 
could affect Germany’s projected €483 million contribution to the NATO program as 
well.21 Chancellor Merkel and Defense Minister Thomas de Mazière appear to have 
survived what was viewed by many in Germany as a scandal with a handy election 
victory in September 2013, but so far there is no definitive news regarding restarting the 
program or its implications for AGS.  
Can solidarity and continued commitment within the AGS coalition of the willing 
be maintained against such countercurrents?  To what extent will other factors such as 
                                                 
17 Amy Butler, “Why Global Hawk Block 40 May Be Killed,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
February 25, 2013, http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_02_25_2013_p22-
550617.xml&p=3. 
18 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Cost of Flying Northrop’s Global Hawk down Over 50 Percent: Sources,” 
Reuters, September 13, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-northropgrumman-
globalhawk-idUSBRE98C12220130913; Brian Everstine, “Readiness Declines in Aging, Overworked 
Fleet,” Military Times, October 2, 2013, 
http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20131002/NEWS04/310020026/Readiness-declines-aging-
overworked-fleet. 
19 “Triton,” Northrop Grumman Corporation, accessed February 9, 2014, 
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/Triton/Pages/default.aspx. 
20 “German Defense Minister to Face Grilling over Euro Hawk Debacle,” Deutsche Welle, July 22, 
2013, http://www.dw.de/german-defense-minister-to-face-grilling-over-euro-hawk-debacle/a-16964646; 
Justyna Gotkowska, “The End of the German Euro Hawk Programme—The Implications for Germany and 
NATO,” ISN ETH Zurich, June 3, 2013, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/layout/set/print/content/view/full/24620?id=164644. 
21 Gotkowska, “The End of the German Euro Hawk Programme.” 
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industrial interests, continuing operational requirements, and evolving threats to the 
Alliance affect the future of AGS? This study hypothesizes that a combination of 
rationales will keep AGS alive, but that its significance as a model for Secretary 
Rasmussen’s Smart Defense is dubious. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are few comprehensive works on AGS available. Pierre A. Chao of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies and Jane’s Defence Weekly prepared 
studies in 2004 and 2006 (respectively) that provide truncated histories and forecasts 
while exploring the program’s relevance to NATO’s future. Besides these and the 
factsheet from NATO’s website, most of the available sources were produced in 
conjunction with evolutionary milestones in the AGS program and are limited to cursory 
descriptions of achievements and recent highlights. A myriad of references to AGS are 
found in analyses that focus on Smart Defense; Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR); NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya; etc. By themselves, these 
sources do not provide much insight regarding the topic at hand, but when linked together 
and then paired with NATO’s strategic documents, they start to build a more meaningful 
picture.   
As for academic “camps” or differing points of view, the research thus far has 
discovered little.  This may be due in part to a dearth of position papers written on AGS 
since the requirement was first established in 1992.  This dearth may in turn be attributed 
to the fact that AGS has been regarded in political and journalistic discourse as a 
technical matter, not one deserving of the “high politics” attention awarded to nuclear and 
missile defense matters. Another factor may be that there was so little public 
disagreement regarding AGS prior to its near disintegration and revival in 2007. This 
likely has to do with the fact that all Allies agreed on the need for a ground surveillance 
capability, but did not want internal competition to diminish the appearance of NATO 
solidarity.  
 
 8 
Despite these limitations, the thesis research will focus on ISR and aviation-
related scholarly journal articles on AGS, aerial ground surveillance, and Smart Defense. 
The main message in the recent literature on ISR in NATO can be characterized 
as follows: European ISR assets are insufficient, and NATO reliance on U.S. national 
assets is both imprudent and inequitable. The NATO foray in Libya in 2011 is often cited 
as evidence of this overreliance. Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer sum up the 
relationship as follows: “The campaign as a whole remained heavily dependent on the 
U.S. to provide [ISR] capabilities,” specifically U.S. AWACS (which supported the 
operation with 1,650 flying hours, despite the claim that NATO AWACS provided 24/7 
coverage of the conflict), JSTARS, and satellites.22 The New York Times stated similarly 
that “Europe’s military capabilities fell far short of what was needed, even for such a 
limited fight.”23  
Although the Libya experience was informative and reinforcing, NATO has 
known about the deficiencies in its non-U.S. ISR capabilities for a long time. The 1992 
requirement decision for joint airborne ground surveillance showcases this point. A 2003 
Rand study on the interoperability of U.S. and NATO capabilities through the 1990s 
noted the danger of overreliance upon U.S. low-density, high-demand (LD/HD) assets.24 
Most ISR capabilities—even for U.S. allies—are unsurprisingly located in LD/HD assets. 
Moreover, the preponderance of the assets (RC-135, EC-130, E-8, U-2/Global Hawk, 
MQ-1/9 Predator/Reaper, etc.) are U.S. national assets. To be fair, several European 
Allies maintain ISR assets. Notable examples include the British, who have five Sentinel 
jets, seven AWACS, and six Tornado fighter squadrons (which can serve in an electronic 
surveillance role when properly equipped); the French, who have two C-160G Gabriel  
 
 
                                                 
22 Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, “Towards a ‘Post-American’ Alliance?” International Affairs 
88, no. 2 (2012); Mike W. Ray, “552 ACW Receives Outstanding Unit Award,” Tinker Take Off, October 
26, 2012, http://journalrecord.com/tinkertakeoff/2012/10/26/552nd-acw-receives-outstanding-unit-award/. 
23 “NATO’s Teachable Moment,” The New York Times, August 29, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/opinion/natos-teachable-moment.html?_r=0. 
24 Eric Larson, Interoperability of US and NATO Allied Air Forces: Supporting Data and Case 
Studies [Project Air Force] (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003), xiv–xvi. 
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electronic intelligence aircraft and four AWACS; the Germans, who have 31 electronic 
warfare/surveillance Tornados; and the Italians, who have 16 Tornados. Moreover, 
NATO has a fleet of 17 AWACS.25 
Nevertheless, given their utility and relative scarcity, LD/HD aircraft are among 
the assets most likely to be pulled from joint operations if national needs dictate. The 
Rand study asserts that NATO missions could be compromised if U.S. ISR assets were 
re-tasked mid-operation.26 Additionally, the report documents strategic, operational, 
tactical, and technological problems associated with the use of national assets in every 
major NATO engagement.27 A jointly owned and operated platform would help resolve 
these issues, and most of the literature presents NATO AGS as an answer to the problem 
of NATO’s dependence on U.S. JSTARS and Global Hawks.  
The Smart Defense literature consists of speeches by the NATO Secretary 
General and other Alliance officials and analytical studies by scholars, primarily in 
NATO nations. The obligatorily cited Rasmussen speech at the Munich Security 
Conference on 4 February 2012 outlines the Secretary General’s concept of what Smart 
Defense could (and should) be.  
Danish Colonel Jakob Henius and University of Edinburgh Professor Jacopo 
Leone MacDonald published Smart Defense: A Critical Appraisal for the NATO Defense 
College just prior to the Chicago Summit. MacDonald compares NATO’s budget 
problems to a statement attributed to Lord Ernest Rutherford: “Gentlemen, we have run 
out of money.  It is time to start thinking.”28 Despite this promising foreshadow of 
program cogency, Smart Defense remains largely a cerebral success. The report argues 
                                                 
25 In the 1970s, France and the UK opted to purchase their own AWACS instead of participating in 
the NATO AWACS program.  This preference is unchanged, and today France and the UK plan to 
contribute national assets to NATO operations instead of being full AGS partners. Interestingly, these “in-
kind” assets were previously slated to be terminated. See Chapter II for a further description; Tornado 
figures from “World Air Forces 2013,” Flight Global, accessed February 9, 2014, 
http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/emptys/101015/world-air-forces-2013.pdf. 
26 Larson, Interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied Air Forces, xiv–-xvi. 
27 Ibid., xiii. 
28 Jacopo Leone MacDonald, “The Basics of Smart Defense,” ed. Jakob Henius and Jacopo Leone 
MacDonald, Forum Paper Series, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2012. 
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that evidence both supports and detracts from Smart Defense, and that it is “an old idea” 
that should not be discounted because it is also “based on new premises.” Like much of 
the literature, A Critical Appraisal concludes with the idea that under conditions of 
austerity, non-Smart Defense initiatives “appear singularly unwise”—dumb defense by 
another name.29   
Colonel Henius continues to explore the drawbacks of Smart Defense in 
“Specialization: The Gordian Knot of NATO’s Smart Defense,” in which he outlines a 
variety of clearly defined reasons why states resist specializing in their militaries.  These 
all essentially boil down to the rational fear of being left without necessary capabilities in 
the event of a less than major Article 5 response.30  
In the same vein, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs published Smart Defense 
and the Future of NATO, which offers the idea that nations “need to make bold decisions 
about sensitive issues.” It contends, as do most articles supportive of the initiative, that 
despite the seeming affront to sovereignty, Smart Defense remains in the Allies’ 
individual as well as collective interests.31  
Camille Grand, the Director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 
neatly outlines the rationale for Smart Defense and “some elements for a successful 
Smart Defense.”32 While Grand gives sound and sensible policy recommendations, they 
largely share the same weakness, that is, they offer generalities when specifics are 
needed. This is a common shortcoming in writings on Smart Defense and NATO. 
Relating Smart Defense to AGS, Grand refers to AGS as a flagship Smart Defense 
project without explaining how a program qualifies as such a project, and then criticizes 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Jakob Henius, “Specialization: The Gordian Knot of NATO’s Smart Defense,” Smart Defense, A 
Critical Appraisal, ed. Jakob Henius and Jacopo Leone MacDonald, Forum Paper Series, Rome: NATO 
Defense College, 2012. 
31 Lisa Aronsson and Molly O’Donnell, Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance 
Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century? The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, March 2012, 9, 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/userfiles/file/NATO/Conference_Report.pdf. 
32 Camille Grand, “Smart Defense,” Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet 
the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century? The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, March 2012, 47, 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/userfiles/file/NATO/Conference_Report.pdf. 
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Secretary General Rasmussen for associating “Smart Defense and [the] consolidation of 
large projects such as AGS or missile defense without explaining the link further.”33 
Such is the elusive nature of Smart Defense: it is easy to generalize about, but nearly 
impossible to pin down. Essentially, the idea is acquiring, maintaining, and operating 
capabilities on a multinational basis with a view to generating greater efficiency that 
might be achievable on a national basis. Indeed, some capabilities might not be 
achievable if limited to the individual state level. 
More recently, Bastian Giegerich has sounded the alarm on the uncoordinated 
nature of budget cuts among the NATO Allies. In his judgment, budget reductions 
threaten the ability of NATO Allies to contribute to the Alliance, while the flagship SD 
programs have been “in the works for a long time, and are thus unlikely to serve as a 
lasting inspiration for Smart Defense as a whole.” Giegerich has proposed redefining SD 
as “creating value in defense,” not limited SD cost savings, and perhaps most 
importantly, the “promotion of transatlantic solidarity and common security in times of 
austerity.”34 
In contrast, Michael Rühle has drawn attention to the shortcomings of SD thus 
far. He has advanced compelling explanations for why these are unlikely to change, and 
why European defense budget cutbacks will irritate the United States (but not irrevocably 
so). In his view, NATO will evolve into “a transatlantic security community with lower 
ambitions, yet with a continuously solid institutional relationship.”35 Rühle concludes, 
“While the military-operational or financial benefits of pooling and sharing may remain 
small, the pursuit of such approaches has meanwhile become a political imperative 
irrespective of potential military gains.”36 In other words, despite the modesty of SD 
results from a financial and operational viewpoint, SD efforts may help to sustain the 
transatlantic Alliance. AGS, for all its shortcomings, fits nicely into this definition of SD. 
                                                 
33  Ibid, 47, 48. 
34 Bastian Giegerich’s assessment and quotes from NATO Allied Command Transformation, the 
University of Bologna, and the Instituto Affari Internazionali’s Dynamic Change: Rethinking NATO’s 
Capabilities, Operations and Partnerships, October  2012, 8, 21, 28. 
35 Ruhle, “The Future of the Transatlantic Security Relationship,” 1. 
36 Ibid, 4. 
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C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a case study on NATO’s multi-national acquisition of AGS. The 
broader field of inquiry is decision-making and bargaining for the acquisition of 
commonly funded capabilities in an alliance.  The analytical approach will be empirical 
and historical, and the author will rely on qualitative judgments rather than quantitative or 
statistical methods. As noted in the literature review, this thesis is based on published 
sources. 
There are certain issues that this thesis will not address. While each of these 
issues could be examined in a separate multi-chapter thesis, this author leaves them to be 
explored by other researchers in order to focus on the specifics of AGS. 
While this thesis focuses on the aerial portion of the AGS program, it does not 
cover the Canadian-European developed ground portion, which could be critical to the 
future of AGS in some circumstances. 
Other topics to be left for other researchers include the debate over the ethics of 
manned versus unmanned military aircraft.  While this is an important topic from a 
philosophical point of view, the arguments seemingly desiccate down to technological 
limitations and value judgments, both of which can be reassessed with innovation and 
circumstance. This thesis also does not assess in detail the relative advantages of 
variously proposed technical options for AGS (i.e., types of radar and sensor packages 
that were ultimately not selected), nor will it address the relative capabilities, advantages, 
or disadvantages of the U-2 and Global Hawk variants.  Another relevant issue related to 
Smart Defense is the phenomenon of multi-national military acquisitions outside the 
NATO framework.  Though some of these programs have been successful and are 
mentioned, they present their own separate challenges and will not be fully explored here.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized as follows. This chapter sets out the main questions raised 
in this investigation and the basic logic of the thesis. Chapter II covers AGS background. 
It begins with an analysis of NATO’s AWACS program, the program after which AGS 
was initially modeled. Following this discussion, the chapter covers AGS history and 
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current status. Chapter III explores the operational significance of AGS as a shared 
airborne ground surveillance capability. This chapter defines ground surveillance as a 
necessary conventional capability that has remained relevant throughout the many 
evolutions in NATO’s strategic direction. NATO’s security challenges and level of 
ambition, and the diverse priorities of the Allies are also discussed. Chapter IV analyzes 
the institutional significance of AGS. This chapter examines major issues within the 
Alliance and relates AGS to NATO’s Smart Defense initiative. The chapter concludes 
with informed judgments regarding the impact of AGS on the future of Smart Defense. 
The concluding chapter summarizes the principal findings. 
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II. WHAT IS AGS? 
Twenty-one years after NATO resolved to achieve the capability of airborne 
ground surveillance, AGS has gone from inaction to enaction. Smiling NATO leaders and 
national politicians present AGS as a worthy success that came from longstanding 
partnerships and steadfast resolve toward obtaining such a capability. Unsurprisingly, the 
fanfare at the signing of commitments at the Chicago Summit in 2012 was not reflective 
of AGS’ turbulent history. Today, 15 allies are committed to funding the procurement of 
five Northrop Grumman Global Hawk aircraft that are a version of the U.S. Air Force 
Block 40 variant and that also include some European technologies. Twenty-six Allies 
are committed to AGS common operating and sustainment budgets. As of this writing in 
March 2014, NATO operators are scheduled to receive the first aircraft in 2016, and full 
operating capability is projected in 2017.37 
This chapter presents a more complete discussion of NATO’s Alliance Ground 
Surveillance (AGS) program than is currently available. Though there have been some 
recent news articles on the program, a casual observer is limited to outdated or 
incomplete reports and NATO’s own words. While the description of AGS on NATO’s 
website is accurate, it presents an overly optimistic viewpoint and glosses over some of 
the program’s deficiencies and future hurdles. To remedy this, this chapter explores what 
AGS is, reviews the history of the NE-3A as an emulated predecessor program, and then 
brings the reader up to speed on the situation today.  
A. VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS 
Some of the contentious questions regarding AGS are: Why did it take so long to 
achieve consensus? Why did some allies commit to the program while others did not? 
Can national assets be used in lieu of an expensive joint acquisition? Is such a shared 
capability necessary? 
                                                 
37 Michael C. Sirak, “NATO’s New Eyes in the Sky,” September 24, 2013, ISN ETH Zurich, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=169484. 
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AGS is a bit of an enigma, but oddity is normal in multi-national endeavors. The 
NATO website uses the expression “AGS participant” to designate procuring Allies, but 
this obfuscates the story a bit. Because it is an alliance that respects the sovereignty of 
each member state, all NATO decisions require consensus. In the case of AGS, however, 
a variety of consensuses were needed. To start, on the political level, all 28 Allies 
officially support the AGS program.38 Only France and the UK have opted to not 
contribute to the program’s recurring operational costs, which are not to exceed 
(approximately) $107 million annually; 15 of the 28 member states have agreed to 
contribute to the $1.7 billion acquisition.  
In the last two decades, these agreements were difficult to attain because of “how” 
the program would be implemented. Though ground surveillance was recognized as a 
necessary capability that the United States had and that Canada and the European 
generally lacked, differences of opinion regarding how to remedy this disparity resulted 
in decades of delays in an otherwise simple acquisition. While all desired AGS, the 
perception of costs and benefits differed for each Ally. The relative importance of AGS 
appears to have been based on the projected economic gain and on national views of 
security threats. Thus, as military budgets shrank and the AGS acquisition evolved, 
NATO’s roster of full participants shifted. Some allies withdrew to save money, while 
others joined up to display solidarity. The AGS process has been an exercise in both 
dedication and uncertainty.  
Arguments are still made both for and against the necessity of a jointly acquired 
ground surveillance capability. As recently as 2010, Ben Friedman of the Cato Institute 
objected to the $1.2 billion price tag and argued, “NATO should scrap the AGS  
 
 
                                                 
38 Though “support” in this instance may sound impressive, it really only means that no Ally has 
voiced official opposition (broken silence) to the program. Such an assertion by any Ally would instantly 
remove the “NATO” from “NATO AGS”. Consensus was reached on AGS despite Iceland and Hungary 
never wishing to involve themselves in early stages, because their reticent positions were acceptable to the 
other allies.  
 17 
program and rely on the aircraft flown by member nations.”39 Perhaps Friedman was 
correct to raise questions about affordability, because by 2012, cost overruns for the 
program had ballooned to $1.7 billion.40  
U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Steve Schmidt, whose NATO Airborne Early Warning 
and Control Force Command is slated to operate the AGS Global Hawks and currently 
operates NATO AWACS, disagrees with Friedman’s prescription. He calls AGS “the key 
to the future,” and is convinced of the need for the capability that AGS is expected to 
provide.41 On one hand, NATO has operated adequately, if disjointedly, without such 
jointly procured and operated capabilities in the past and some observers might find 
General Schmidt’s judgment excessively grandiloquent. On the other hand, there are 
fewer reasons to believe that national assets will be able to fulfill NATO’s desire for 
robust capabilities in the future. As technology evolves and budget priorities shift, some 
Allies may be unable to continue acquiring and maintaining national military capabilities 
that are meaningful to the Alliance. AGS may be part of the answer for these Allies. 
Programs like AGS ideally aid in keeping all the Allies relevant to the Alliance by 
giving them a role in NATO’s new operational capabilities. Additionally, these 
cooperative projects promise to keep the Alliance relevant to the Allies by providing 
them with access to capabilities that are firmly in their interest. If the latter hypothesis is 
correct—and this thesis concludes that it is correct—then AGS may indeed be one of the 
keys to NATO’s future.  
B. SCHOLARLY WORKS ON AGS 
With few exceptions, the publicly available written works on AGS are noteworthy 
for their lack of breadth and depth. Nonetheless, research on the program is warranted for 
several reasons, including 1) an inadequate amount of scholarly work that examines the 
program holistically and critically, 2) the significance of a success or failure of AGS for 
                                                 
39 Dave Majumdar, “Ground Truth,” C4ISR—The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare, July 1, 2010, 16.  
40 Kate Brannen, “NATO Signs$1.7B Global Hawk Contract,” Defense News, May 21, 2012, 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120521/DEFREG02/305210001/NATO-Signs-1-7B-Global-Hawk-
Contract. 
41 Majumdar, “Ground Truth.” 
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the concept of Smart Defense and the unity and operational credibility of the alliance, and 
3) recent events surrounding Global/Euro Hawk programs in the United States and 
Germany. 
Aside from the information on NATO’s website, the last consolidated scholarly 
updates on AGS were written in 2004 and 2006.  The 2004 version was produced by 
Pierre A. Chao, the Director of Defense Industrial Initiatives at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS).  He gave a perceptive outline of AGS relevance as a 
capability and as a reflection of larger NATO strengths and weaknesses and raised issues 
that hampered (and still hamper) the program. Chao concluded that a successful AGS 
“enhances the Transatlantic Alliance more broadly.” This work was good, but could be 
expanded and needs to be brought up to date. 42 In 2006, Jane’s Defence Weekly 
published “Airborne Ground Surveillance-Taking the High Road,” which gave an update 
on aerial ground surveillance in general, but delved more into the technical history of the 
USAF E-8 JSTARS, U-2 Dragonlady, and the United Kingdom’s Airborne Stand-Off 
Radar (ASTOR) radar and sensor capabilities than into NATO’s AGS.43 As if inspired by 
a premonition, this 2006 article articulated the possibility that AGS would shrink to a 
UAV only project (this would occur in 2008).44 The intent of this chapter is to provide a 
summary background and an analysis of recent events, to bring the reader up to date on 
the latest in AGS.  
C. AGS PRECURSOR: NATO AWACS 
When conceiving AGS, NATO planners did not have to start with a blank slate. In 
1978, NATO jointly acquired an airborne early warning (AEW) capability that exists 
today as 17 NE-3A AWACS.45 Today, along with British E-3D’s, these platforms 
                                                 
42 Pierre A. Chao, NATO AGS-Finally Ready to Fly (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2004), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0407_natoags.pdf. 
43 “Airborne Ground Surveillance-Taking the High Road,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 23, 
2006.  
44 Ibid. 
45 There were initially 18 NATO AWACS purchased. One of these crashed following an aborted 
takeoff on July 14, 1996 in Aktion, Greece. 
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provide NATO its “Eye in the Sky.”46 The airplanes’ home station is NATO Air Base 
Geilenkirchen in northwest Germany. Along with the supporting personnel, these aircraft 
make up “NATO’s first integrated, multi-national flying unit, providing rapid 
deployability, airborne surveillance, [and] command, control and communication for 
NATO operations.”47 The AEW program is supplemented with national assets from 
France and the United States, and uniquely by the UK, which commits its six E-3Ds to 
NATO to fulfill “25% of the Force’s annual operational output.”48 Like AGS, the NATO 
AWACS was a tough sell for Allied nations that wanted the capability, but not the price 
tag. National benefits were also contested, with each Ally rightly attempting to maximize 
domestic benefits from the joint program. In many ways, the motivations, obstacles, and 
perceived benefits of AGS are reflected in its predecessor AWACS program. 
In 1970, NATO defense planners identified a problem.  Flying at high speed and 
low altitudes, the latest generation Soviet fighters could penetrate the NATO Air Defense 
Ground Environment radar chain and strike before being detected. The rationale for 
AEW was accepted by European nations prior to this discovery, but the updated Soviet 
threat led the Allies to pursue a joint AWACS acquisition with significantly more 
alacrity. Although the United States intended to acquire of its own fleet of E-3s, then the 
most expensive aircraft in the world, Washington was unwilling to grant exclusive 
prioritization of their use for European operations. This meant that if U.S. AWACS were 
needed elsewhere, Europe might be left exposed. The reliance upon U.S. national 
capabilities for European defense created strategic problems that were not limited to 
AEW, but unlike the nuclear issue, aerial reconnaissance was not accompanied with 
political controversy (save its expense), so it was a capability that Allies could jointly 
pursue. This did not mean that its acquisition was an easy task. 49 
                                                 
46 “E-3D Component—RAF Waddington, United Kingdom,” NATO AEW&C Programme 
Management Agency, http://www.napma.nato.int/organisation/7.html. 
47 “NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force E-3A Component,” NATO E-3A Component, 
http://www.e3a.nato.int/.  
48 “E-3D Component—RAF Waddington, United Kingdom,” NATO AEW&C Programme 
Management Agency, http://www.napma.nato.int/organisation/7.html. 
49 Furlong, “Can NATO afford AWACS?,” 671. 
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A major stumbling block to joint acquisition of AWACS was the division of 
national benefits. This was a problem because the E-3 was almost entirely built by 
Boeing, in America, with American workers. In the true spirit of jointness, however, each 
participating Ally expected to receive a share of spending inside its country 
commensurate with its costs. European Allies desired more European industry 
involvement in the AWACS acquisition, but fiscal and technological constraints made 
such a move impractical. Because many European Allies did not wish to increase their 
reliance upon the United States by committing to long-term procurement contracts that 
bolstered U.S. industry at European expense, the Allies came to an impasse. 
The problem was settled in two ways: the first was for the United States to 
subsidize Allied participation, and the second was for France and the UK to retain more 
independence by offering national “assets-in-kind.” Because simply sending checks to 
Seattle was politically and economically unpalatable for European Allies, Washington 
was forced to sweeten the deal. By offering advantageous trade “offsets” to various 
Allies, the U.S. subsidized European participants that did not receive economic or 
industrial benefits commensurate with their contributions.50 For some larger partners, the 
program had more obvious advantages. Germany benefitted economically and 
defensively by having the E-3s based on its territory, while other Allies—Greece, Italy, 
Norway, and Turkey—would benefit by hosting the AWACS at permanent forward 
operating locations.  
France and the UK remained unconvinced that a joint NATO acquisition was in 
their best interest. Britain thought that “delays likely in the NATO programme could not 
be tolerated,” while France was not then part of NATO’s integrated military command 
structure; and neither seemed comfortable with an increasing reliance upon the US-
dominated alliance.51 Ironically, by 1990, both had decided to contribute to the European 
AEW capability through the purchase of national, but nevertheless US-produced, E-3s of 
their own. Perhaps most importantly, the decision to maintain national assets allowed 
                                                 
50 Charles Wolf Jr. et. al., ‘Offsets’ for NATO Procurement of the Airborne Warning and Control 
System: Opportunities and Implications (United States Air Force Project) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1976). 
51 Doug Richardson, “Collaborative Weapons. Can they Work?,” Flight Global, June 1, 1985, 
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1985/1985%20-%201736.html. 
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France and the United Kingdom the same freedom of action enjoyed by the United 
States. Despite NATO rules for consensus, independent assets ensured that these three 
Allies could not veto each other’s ability to have airborne early warning. 
The NATO requirement for consensus to employ joint assets has the potential to 
idle desired capabilities, but the NATO AWACS have been kept usefully employed 
through much of their existence. Through the 1980s, they were used as intended, 
monitoring the European skies against potential Soviet aggression and thereby 
contributing to the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture. Through the 1990s 
AWACS were used extensively, notably in the Balkans. Since 9/11—and noting 
Operation Eagle Assist in 2001–2002, recent operations over Afghanistan, and Operation 
Unified Protector in 2011—the NATO AWACS have been comparatively idle. More 
recent schisms within the Alliance reveal what Camille Grand calls “difficulties 
involving collective capabilities” that “set a worrying precedent.”52 As NATO missions 
increasingly consist of seemingly optional expeditionary interventions, Allies can expect 
more difficulties ahead when trying to tap joint assets.  
After the 18 E-3A aircraft were delivered to the Alliance in 1982–1985, they 
formed an important part of NATO’s defense posture. Much like AGS, though, the 
program took a long time to get airborne. Although flying operations began in 1982, 
NATO would not declare full operational capability until “the end of 1988.”53 Despite its 
earlier concerns about NATO’s slow procurement practices, Britain’s national AEW 
program never came to be, and it was unable to contribute to NATO’s AEW program 
until the early 1990s. 
U.S. and NATO AWACS roles began to diverge following the end of the Cold 
War. From 9 August 1990 NATO and U.S. AWACS jointly monitored the skies over 
Turkey and Iraq. Two weeks after the war ended (16 March 1991), NATO AWACS 
                                                 
52 Grand, “Smart Defense,” 46. 
53 “NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force, E-3A Component,” Public Affairs Office, 
www.e3a.nato.int/common/files/en_factsheet_apr2013.pdf. 
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headed home, while U.S. AWACS would remain on daily patrols for 12 years.54 
Following Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein used his remaining military assets to 
brutally punish those portions of his population that had attempted to oust him. In 
response to these acts, and under the authority of UN Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolutions 687 and 688, the United States established no-fly zones that evolved into 
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch. These operations were 
ongoing from 1991 and, with few interruptions, lasted until the subsequent U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The operations were very demanding on U.S. LD/HD assets, 
were in line with NATO’s objectives as stated in the 1991 Strategic Concept,55 and even 
legitimized by the UNSC. Nonetheless, NATO AWACS deployments were largely 
limited to collective defense and non-Article 5 operations in Europe until 2011. 
Prior to 2011, almost all significant NATO AWACS deployments were to the 
Balkans. Exceptions included 36 Libya monitoring missions in 1992 and recurring border 
defense of Turkey. Within the context of Balkan area missions, there were three major 
combat and monitoring deployments: Operation Sky Monitor and Operation Deny Flight 
in 1992-1994, Operations Deadeye and Deliberate Force in 1995, and Operation Allied 
Force in 1999. Over the course of these operations, the NATO AWACS logged 10,667 
sorties.56  
In 1992 the first tranche of missions took place over Hungary and the Adriatic Sea 
in support of UNSC-authorized operations in Bosnia; the next major deployments took 
place from 24 March 1999 until 9 June 1999, when 14 NATO AWACS provided around 
the clock aerial surveillance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo.57 
Though these operations were considered successful as far as the use of the NATO 
AWACS was concerned, political wrangling may have taught the United States lessons 
                                                 
54 NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force: E-3A Component, “NATO AWACS: Operations 
1990-2012,” http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/organizations/operations.htm. 
55 North Atlantic Council, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” November 1991, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm. Thematic, but especially paragraphs 11, 12, 
41. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Leigh Armistead and Edwin Leigh Armistead, AWACS and Hawkeyes: The Complete History of 
Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2002), 180, 181. 
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about the complications associated with fighting wars while dependent on Allied 
consensus. In subsequent conflicts, the initial U.S. preference for reliance on national 
assets may have sidelined joint assets in the name of American pragmatism. 
Less than a month after 9/11, the United States requested NATO support in an 
unexpected way. Instead of requesting that the Allies go to war in Afghanistan together, 
Washington requested that NATO E-3s be deployed to the United States as part of 
Operation Eagle Assist, in order to free up U.S. AWACS for non-NATO deployments.58 
While U.S. AWACS helped initiate Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and 
continued to maintain no-fly zones in Iraq, NATO AWACS in Operation Eagle Assist 
logged over 3,000 hours of flight time over the continental United States in the period 
from October 2001 to May 2002.59 Concurrent with the kickoff of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in March 2003, NATO E-3s deployed to Turkey as part of Operation Crescent 
Guard. Their two month mission (20 February to 16 April 2003) was to augment 
Turkey’s integrated air defense system on missions that were thankfully described as 
“fairly quiet.”60 Following a July 2008 request for assistance and delayed by lengthy 
debates about costs and usefulness, NATO AWACS resumed their combat role on 15 
January 2011 under the banner of Operation Afghan Assist.61 Because the aircraft are 
based at Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, this operation was the first in which the NATO 
Allies operated their AEW system from outside NATO territory.62  
Soon after NATO assumed this new role in supporting ISAF, discord regarding 
the conflict in Libya further strained the North Atlantic alliance. During the well 
documented row between Germany and other Allies, the AWACS program provided 
                                                 
58 U.S. Department of State: Office of the Spokesman, “NATO AWACs Deployed to the United 
States,” October 18, 2001, http://2001-2009/state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/5447.htm. 
59 U.S. Department of State, “NATO Coalition Contributes to Global War on Terrorism,” October 24, 
2002, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/14627.htm. 
60 NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force: E-3A Component, “NATO AWACS: Operations 
1990-2012,” http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/organizations/operations.htm  
61 Axel Springer, “Berlin and Paris Argue on AWACS Deployment to Afghanistan,” Die Welt, March 
24, 2009, http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article3432228/Berlin-und-Paris-streiten-ueber-Awacs-Einsatz-
fuer-Afghanistan.html. 
62 NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force: E-3A Component, “NATO AWACS: Operations 
1990–2012,” http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/organizations/operations.htm 
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Germany legal and political maneuvering space. Instead of directly participating in (or 
supporting) Operation Unified Protector—which might well have triggered a potentially 
embarrassing parliamentary vote for Chancellor Merkel—Germany shifted personnel to 
the AWACS mission in Afghanistan, which freed up other Allied forces for Libya.63 
Though the Alliance managed to work through each of these conflicts acceptably, these 
more recent examples showcase how political limitations can hinder the effective use of 
multi-national assets.  
D. AEW/AGS COST SHARING 
Though not intentional, AEW and AGS contribution levels are similar (see Table 
1).64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 “Germany’s Libya Contribution: Merkel Cabinet Approves AWACS for Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel 
Online, March 23, 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/germany-s-libya-contribution-merkel-
cabinet-approves-awacs-for-afghanistan-a-752709.html. 
64 It is important to note that outside the NATO acquisitions, France and the UK maintain national 
AEW systems, while the United States and Germany pursued expensive national Global/Euro Hawk AGS 
programs as well. 
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Table 1.   Ally Contributions to NATO AWACS and NATO AGS 
Ally NATO AWACS 
Contributions 198065 
NATO AGS Contributions 201366 
TOTAL $1.826B $1.7B (€1.343B)67 
United States 42.12% ($769M) 37.09% (€502.38) 
FRG/Germany 30.72% ($560M) 29.57% (€400.47) 
France Non-participant Providing contributions in kind 
Canada 9.78% ($179M) 0 
Italy 5.59% ($102M) 13.08% (€177.23) 
Netherlands 3.29% ($60M) 0 
Denmark 1.67% ($30M) 3.43% (€46.51) 
Norway 1.36% ($25M) 2.95% (€39.91) 
UK 1.06%68 ($19.4M) Providing contributions in kind 
Turkey 0.84% ($15M) 0 
Greece 0.66% ($12M) 0 
Portugal .08% ($1.5M) 0 
Luxembourg .09% ($1.5M) 0.26% (€3.47) 
Belgium 0 0 
Spain Not Allied Expected to contribute 8.8% (€150)69 
Poland Not Allied Expected to contribute 4.5% (€75) starting 
in 201470 
Romania Not Allied 1.867 (€25.28) 
Czech Republic Not Allied 1.51% (€20.51) 
Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
Not Allied 2.55% (€34.51) 
 
                                                 
65 Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress of the United States: Equitable 
Cost Sharing Questioned on NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control Program,” July 1, 1980, United 
States General Accounting Office, 10. The numbers in this report do not add up to 100 percent due to 
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E. EVOLUTION OF ALLIANCE PARTICIPATION IN AGS 
Beginning in 1992, the NATO Defense Planning Committee formalized the 
requirement for JSTARS-type air ground surveillance capability.71 By 1995, the NATO 
Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) recommended a “NATO-owned 
and operated core AGS capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets.”72 
Initially, the United States proposed the US-built JSTARS platform as the ideal platform 
to fulfill the requirement—the requirement was predicated on JSTARS battle 
performance after all—but European Allies did not favor this proposal because of 
inequities in industrial benefits and because the U.S. refused to fully release technical 
data regarding the sensor technologies. In 1997, the JSTARS proposal was dismissed in 
favor of an unspecified proposal that would allow for more European benefits.73 
From 1998 through 2004, competition took place for the design of AGS. The 
NATO Transatlantic Advanced Radar Program, which included Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and the United States, competed against the Standoff 
Surveillance Target Acquisition Radar program, which included France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Spain.74 By April 2002, all of the erstwhile efforts coalesced into 
the Transatlantic Industrial Proposed Solution (TIPS), whose members included EADS, 
Galileo Avionica, Northrop Grumman, Thales, General Dynamics Canada, and Indra 
(Spain). TIPS proposed the Airbus 321 manned aircraft along with Global/Euro Hawks.75 
Soon after, in November 2002, the Prague Summit reinforced NATO’s commitment to 
AGS, and presented the ideational concept of a full operating capability of 12 A321s by 
2010, with consideration for additional UAVs by 2008. 76 Following the Prague summit, 
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NATO received an unsolicited proposal called the Cooperative Transatlantic AGS 
System (CTAS) from Raytheon and Alenia Marconi Systems. This proposal suggested 
using Global Express jet manned platforms and a variety of UAVs for AGS.77 The 
NATO CNAD dismissed the CTAS proposal in favor of the TIPS solution in April 
2004.78 By 2005, though, the TIPS proposal had shrunk to five or six A321s and 7 RQ-4s 
although it retained its $4 billion cost. 79 The changes in AGS costs and capabilities were 
beginning to cause doubts within the Alliance about the program in general.  
Nevertheless, 13 years after its conception, NATO AGS received its first real 
funding. In April 2005, NATO officials were “relieved” when 23 Allies agreed to fund a 
$29.6 million “project definition study” to “answer key questions regarding 
interoperability” before moving into the design and development phase. 80 Hungary, 
Iceland, and the UK opted out of funding the AGS study. In 2006 the project’s budget 
had shrunk to $3.6 billion, and “some sources suggest[ed that] only the UAV element 
will go forward.”81 
Disagreements between Allies continued at least until June 2007, when Jane’s 
reported that the A321 had been eliminated from AGS consideration. Despite 15 years of 
agreement on the need for a NATO AGS capability, “Spiraling costs and the inability of 
partners to agree on a common way forced all previous AGS agreements to be 
scrapped.”82 A year later, NATO revived AGS, but as a much reduced program. By June 
2008, Northrop Grumman was the sole prime contractor, and AGS was a completely 
unmanned program. Instead of five A321s that blended European and U.S. sourced 
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sensors, AGS was then supposed to be a $1.4 billion, eight RQ-4 Global Hawk program, 
that was “sourced largely from the United States.”83 Following the acceptance of the 
Northrop Grumman proposal in 2008, Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, and Turkey expressed no interest in contributing to the initial acquisition of 
AGS. By 2009, AGS consisted of 17 Allies, because Spain and Poland had quit as well. 
Though specific information regarding exactly why these countries suspended 
their involvement is sparse, the most probable cause arises from the loss of expected 
domestic economic activity associated with the A321 for the first tranche, and the 
ongoing financial crisis for the second. The decision to base AGS in Italy—instead of 
proposed sites in Greece, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain or Turkey—also 
had to weigh heavily on the minds of on-the-fence governments in 2009.84  
Despite the semi-abandonment by half of the Allies, 2009 was a big year for 
AGS. The signing of a Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU) was a major 
milestone for the program. Per the NATO website, “the PMOU sets the legal, 
organisational, and budgetary framework for the AGS programme and launches both the 
NATO AGS Management Organisation (NAGSMO) and NATO AGS Management 
Agency (NAGSMA) to take charge of the programme.”85 The Northrop Grumman 
announcement was somewhat more revealing when it declared that the PMOU 
demonstrated agreement by 13 Allies to “fund the development phase of a program of 
record with an airborne segment based on the Block 40 RQ-4 Global Hawk high-altitude, 
long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft system (UAS), which includes the Multi-
Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) sensor and supporting ground 
elements.”86 
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Even with the PMOU, the AGS program continued to shrink. Because of budget 
cuts in 2009-2011, the AGS Global Hawk acquisition was reduced from eight to six, at an 
estimated cost of $1.4 billion.87  
2012 was a mixed year for AGS. In March, Canada quit AGS and the NATO 
AWACS program to save $90 million, a move that some thought would end AGS. 88 
Nevertheless, Romania had joined the program in February, and two months later Spain 
rejoined as well. 89 On 20 May 2012, NATO formally signed AGS into existence at the 
Chicago Summit, committing the 14 remaining allies to a $1.7 billion acquisition. 
NATO remained open to Alliance contributions for AGS, and gained two more 
partners after the May 2012 signing. Denmark rejoined the AGS program in December 
2012, and described its involvement as being generally in line with NATO’s Smart 
Defense concept. Specifically, the Danish Defense Ministry noted that operations in 
Libya in 2011 had demonstrated the need for better surveillance in precision targeting.90 
In April 2013, following criticism about its weak participation in the Libya operation, 
Poland announced that it would rejoin the AGS program in 2014 to improve its status 
within the Alliance. The Polish Defense Ministry reportedly believes that “Joining AGS 
will be very significant for increasing Poland’s meaning and strengthening its position in 
NATO structures.”91  
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The most recent AGS news is positive. In December 2013, Northrop Grumman 
began production on the first of five Global Hawks. Following decades of delays in the 
program, the company highlighted the beginning of “on-time production” for the 
platform.92 
F. REASONS FOR DOUBT 
Despite a decade of operations supporting U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
around the world, the Global Hawk has recently been the target of some negative press. 
Opinions about the Global Hawk within the U.S. Air Force took a marked turn for the 
worse following the release of a revealing 2011 report from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Operational Test and Evaluation division. While the AGS Global Hawk will be 
based on the Block 40 variant, the Block 30 predecessor was shown to have major 
shortcomings. This widely sourced report revealed massive cost overruns, operational 
deficiencies in the Block 30 system, and a need to quickly resolve Block 30 issues to 
allow for increased focus on Block 40 matters.93 Since the United States armed services 
were also faced with austerity measures in the form of normal and “sequester” budget 
cuts, the under-capable, over-budget Global Hawk became an attractive target for budget-
trimmers. Northrop Grumman’s widespread operations—spread over 22 states, and in all 
53 of California’s congressional districts—seems to have bought the U.S. Air Force 
Global Hawks some time, however.94 The U.S. Air Force submitted a 2013 budget that 
would have retired the Block 30 variant of the Global Hawk, but that decision was 
overturned by members of Congress who are reportedly preoccupied with employment 
and economic issues in their constituencies.95 
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The Global Hawk program continues to be in trouble. It is on tentative life 
support in the United States and cancelled in Germany. While there remain powerful 
advocates of sustaining the program, the budgetary game of “kick the can down the road” 
cannot go on indefinitely. Eventually, the long dreaded defense cuts will come, and 
programs previously highlighted for possible elimination generally fare poorly in the 
ensuing budget contest. AGS supporters should be concerned that the U.S. Air Force’s 
attempt to end part of its own Global Hawk program due to its higher than anticipated 
costs and lower than expected mission capable rates may be indicative of future problems 
for NATO’s AGS program.  
Political repercussions from the Euro Hawk scandal could affect Germany’s €483 
million contribution as well.96  Neither of these factors has overtly affected the NATO 
acquisition yet, but they signal more uncertainty in AGS’s future. Little news has 
emerged from Germany regarding the Euro Hawk or AGS since the September 2013 
election. The better than expected performance by Chancellor Merkel is likely good news 
for the programs, but Chris Pocock reported in June 2013 that “Germany intends to offer 
for AGS whatever alternative platform it decides to employ for the Cassidian integrated 
signals intelligence system (ISIS) [the German designed sensor suite] that was the 
payload on the Euro Hawk.”97 Whether the new German government will pursue this 
policy option remains to be seen.  
Aside from the issues with the Global Hawk platform itself, there is also a 
problem with AGS’ robustness. Despite the celebratory face that NATO maintained at 
the Chicago Summit and maintains today, AGS enthusiasts from the 1990s or early 2000s 
would likely see the program as a bit of a letdown. Fiscal and political realities have 
significantly reduced the program’s projected acquisitions while retaining a sizable 
portion of the expense. The experts and officials working on AGS have watched the 
program shrink from 12 Airbus 321s and some additional number of unmanned aircraft, 
to five unmanned aircraft whose sister programs are highlighted for elimination in 
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Germany and the United States Air Force. The price tag has also shrunk—from $4 billion 
to $1.7 billion—but, in view of the significantly smaller acquisition, this amount remains 
relatively high. 
European Allies have long expressed concern about sustaining their own defense 
industries. The same Allies must be disappointed in an AGS program whose recognizable 
face is, like the E-3’s before it, not produced in Europe. The program will use radar 
technologies developed in Europe and the United States, but to casual observers, AGS 
appears to be “Made in America.” If further issues with the Global Hawk platform arise, 
this factor could fuel the doubts of European leaders who may already question the 
relevance of AGS for their country or the Alliance. 
When discussing the possible consequences of the Canadian departure from AGS 
and its ramifications for joint NATO programs in the future, NATO E-3 component 
commander German Air Force General Burkhard Pototzsky (dubiously) comforted his 
troops by stating, “We all know NATO, nothing will happen overnight…I expect that 
nobody will lose his job in the near future!”98 Given this political and fiscal context, it is 
hard to imagine that the participating Allies will reverse course and quickly cancel AGS, 
but the possibility cannot be ruled out.  
The reasons to stay the course are many. There is still a need for non-US 
surveillance capabilities, and save mostly ideational French-UK and German programs, 
the European NATO Allies have not chosen to pursue the capability outside the NATO 
Alliance. Also, despite the seeming fickleness in committing to the purchase of 
surveillance platforms, 26 Allies have long been committed to contributing to AGS 
ongoing operations and sustainment budgets. Many of these long term expenditures will 
benefit Belgium, Germany, and Italy, among the European Allies whose personnel and 
companies will be hired to support the program.  
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Nevertheless, one wonders how much Allies truly feel that they are likely to 
benefit from the AGS capability and how much the program has been continued out of 
loyalty and deference to the United States. A major critique of Smart Defense is that it 
would force smaller states to accept solutions that are always more efficiently provided 
by larger states. Some reliance on larger Allies can be justified in the name of efficiency, 
but if taken too far, this concept could destroy Europe’s defense industries in favor of 
“smartly” acquiring more efficiently manufactured American products. AGS may 
contribute to perceptions that America is likely to dominate the Smart Defense 
acquisition process. 
G. REASONS FOR HOPE 
The main reason to believe that the AGS program will be successful is that it has 
signed commitments from all 28 members of the Alliance and now exists as a real 
program. Succinctly put, “All 28 Alliance members will collectively fund the 
infrastructure, all but France will contribute to the satellite bandwidth costs, and all but 
Britain and France will provide money for operations and sustainment.”99 In May 2012, 
Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow called the signing of the AGS 
procurement contracts a “powerful message” of solidarity despite austere economic 
conditions.100  While most Allies continue to fail in meeting NATO’s recommended level 
of two percent of GDP for defense spending, 15 agreed to fund an expensive acquisition 
and 26 Allies committed to pay for the long term sustainment of the program.101 
Inertia is a powerful force, and NATO AGS is rolling. Failure to continue 
ultimately would carry costs that are not limited to dollars and euros. While abandoning 
the program now would very likely result in costly cancellation penalties, there are other 
factors at play as well. As with any Alliance decision, dissent is much more acceptable 
during the negotiation phase of a project. Once the project is agreed upon, Allies will feel 
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a certain level of betrayal and resentment toward a nation that reneges on its 
commitments. This factor may help to dissuade some Allies from withdrawing from the 
AGS program. 
German commitment to the AGS program seemed to be contingent upon the 
continued support of Chancellor Angela Merkel and the new Defense Minister, Ursula 
von der Leyen. Her predecessor, Thomas de Mazière, had been the target of criticism 
over funds wasted on the suspended Euro Hawk program. In cancelling the Euro Hawk, 
de Mazière’s position was clear: “We prefer to pull the plug. That applies to the future as 
well, when costs get out of control. Better an end with horror than a horror without end,’ 
Defence Minister Thomas de Mazière told parliament.”102 Given this environment, 
further cost increases could be unacceptable for Germany’s participation in AGS. 
Nonetheless, EADS’ Integrated Signals Intelligence System remains a significant part of 
AGS, and the CDU/CSU’s strong performance in the September 2013 elections signifies 
a potentially more positive environment for AGS. While Germany’s acquisition of Euro 
Hawks appears to have been ruled out, Berlin’s commitment to NATO AGS seems solid, 
at least for now. 
Recent commitments by Asian states to acquire and base Global Hawks on their 
territory bode well for AGS. Both Japan and South Korea have begun the acquisition 
process for Global Hawks to buttress their militaries. Japan is considering purchasing 
three Global Hawks for maritime patrols,103 while South Korea is now committed to 
purchasing four Global Hawks, most likely to provide near continuous monitoring of its 
northern border.104 Additionally, the United States has recently entered into 
commitments with Japan regarding rotational deployments of Global Hawks at Misawa 
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Air Base.105 These will occur during summer months when poor weather precludes 
operations from the Global Hawk’s normal airfields in Guam.  
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III. OPERATIONAL AGS: WHAT WILL AGS DO? 
While the general public recoiled from pictures of the “highway of death” in early 
1991, military commanders worldwide saw the event differently. NATO commanders 
realized that the targeting technologies used by the United States to defeat Saddam 
Hussein’s powerful army were an absolute necessity in future conflicts. Today, waves of 
mechanized infantry and tanks are not at the forefront of operational consideration, but 
airborne ground surveillance is still considered to be an extraordinarily worthwhile 
capability. The Alliance’s AGS has atrophied from its original robust concept due to 
seemingly self-interested state desires, but it nonetheless remains a relevant and 
beneficial capability concept. Though the previous two decades have seen shifts in 
NATO’s strategic thought, the desire for an airborne ground surveillance capability has 
been sustained.  
Today, NATO divides its purposes into three “core tasks.” These are collective 
defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. AGS advocates claim that the 
ground surveillance capability will be a boon to each task. Swedish Scholar Pal Jonson 
suggests that NATO Allies can also be trifurcated (roughly) along these lines into 
“Collective Defenders,” “Expeditionaries,” and “Russia Firsters.”106 This perspective 
helps explain each Ally’s motivation to participate fully or partially in AGS. The 
divisions also reflect a compromise between the stated ambition of a more proactive 
NATO and the reality of member states whose prime motives are self-interested and 
budget-constrained. This chapter explores AGS benefits and challenges at the operational 
level, examines how the intended functions of AGS have evolved over time in relation to 
NATO’s Strategic Concepts, and suggests that national prioritizations of NATO’s core 
tasks help to explain why specific Allies have chosen to be full or partial members of the 
AGS program.  
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A. AGS OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGES 
Once operational, the AGS system “will continuously detect and track moving 
objects throughout observed areas and will provide radar imagery of areas of interest and 
stationary objects.”107 This capability is currently held by a number of individual Allies, 
but interoperability and sharing issues hinder commanders’ decision making processes. 
With a shared system that is interoperable with evolving NATO technologies, military 
and political leaders will be able to make quicker and better-informed decisions.  
When it comes to long distance ISR, satellites and blimps are the only assets that 
regularly best the endurance of Global Hawks. Since these platforms are not 
operationally flexible (and the fact that NATO does not operate them), the Global Hawk 
represents a major advancement in NATO ISR capabilities. Northrop Grumman also 
touts the Global Hawk’s impressive 32 hour sortie duration, and “the ability to be 
deployed 2,000 nautical miles from its main operating base with a resulting on-station 
time exceeding 24 hours, thus ensuring a ready capability for worldwide operations.”108 
B. AGS OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 
Compared to Afghan and maritime environments, European airspace is 
particularly crowded, and unmanned aircraft currently require a large “safety bubble” 
when operating around other aircraft. As unmanned aircraft technologies mature this 
requirement may someday be overcome, but in the interim, the Global Hawk presents 
cumbersome logistical challenges. Although the Italian government has approved Global 
Hawk operations out of Sicily, these challenges helped kill the Euro Hawk. Looking 
forward, the Allies will have to surmount these challenges to flying through European 
airspace for peacetime operations. 
Though the Global Hawk is advertised as an “all-weather” aircraft, the lack of an 
anti-ice system restricts operations in icing conditions. Hot weather operations present 
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special challenges as well.109 Though this thesis does not presume to forecast where the 
AGS system will be used, one can assume that NATO will not rule out operations in very 
hot and very cold locations. 
The Global Hawk is basically defenseless. While a 60,000 foot operational 
altitude exceeds the range of many weapons, technologies developed decades ago reveal 
the vulnerability of high flying aircraft. Soviet strikes on U-2 aircraft in 1960 and 1962 
are cases in point. Today, the Global Hawk operates with impunity in uncontested 
environments. Lieutenant General Robert Otto, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for 
ISR, has categorized Global Hawks as “permissive ISR” assets.110 At the same time that 
the U.S. Air Force is contemplating dismantling some of its Global Hawk, 
Predator/Reaper UAVs, and MC-12 fleets—all extensively used in uncontested 
Afghanistan-type conflicts—it is actively pursuing a more survivable fleet. General Otto 
continues: “As we decrease the amount of our forces fighting in these permissive 
environments, we have to take a look at our ISR assets and ask if they are the appropriate 
mix to fight in future environments.”111  
The risks associated with using a Global Hawk in a threatening environment may 
marginalize the utility of NATO’s projected AGS.  Global Hawk’s vulnerability to 
conventional anti-aircraft threats makes it a less than ideal collection platform for higher 
risk missions. It is therefore probable that Global Hawks will only be used in operations 
that are militarily safe in order to avoid the political and financial challenges of replacing 
downed aircraft. Even Northrop Grumman, by omission, alludes to this limitation by 
lauding the Global Hawk’s ability to operate alone in “peacetime and early crisis.”112 
One might imagine that an “early crisis” could become a full-fledged crisis if one of 
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NATO’s costly surveillance drones got shot down. Not only would the loss of an aircraft 
be expensive; the loss of one platform would mean the destruction of 20 percent of the 
capability. Given the difficulty of purchasing the initial five aircraft, it seems unlikely 
that the Allies would agree to additional purchases.  
Global Hawks can be used in contested areas, but depending on the threats, the 
need for supporting assets could be significant. The conduct of operations to suppress 
enemy air defenses or to defend Global Hawks with fighter escorts would nullify major 
advantages of long endurance surveillance platforms. In some circumstances, defending 
Global Hawks would place a huge demand on other assets. Dozens of other aircraft might 
be required to support one 24-hour patrol. 
C. IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS (FRANCE AND THE UK) 
According to a 2009 agreement, AGS will be augmented by national “in-kind” 
contributions from Britain and France. Developments in this regard are chronicled in 
Defense Industry Daily’s “Après Harfang: France’s Next High End UAV.”113  Though 
the Anglo-French alliance initially outlined robust plans to develop a system jointly, 
political and technological realities have seemingly ended the venture. Per the UK-France 
Summit 2010 Declaration on Defense and Co-operation: 
Unmanned Air Systems have become essential to our armed forces. We 
have agreed to work together on the next generation of Medium Altitude 
Long Endurance Unmanned Air Surveillance Systems. Co-operation will 
enable the potential sharing of development, support and training costs, 
and ensure that our forces can work together. We will launch a jointly 
funded, competitive assessment phase in 2011, with a view to new 
equipment delivery between 2015 and 2020.114 
Despite having made such announcements regarding Anglo-French cooperation, 
these Allies appear to have retreated from the idea of a joint UAV contribution for AGS.  
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Britain seems to prefer developing its own smaller WK450B Watchkeeper drone while 
maintaining its Raytheon Systems Sentinel R1 battlefield reconnaissance aircraft. The 
French have thus far not fully committed to any system.  
Assuming no progress on joint UAV production by Britain and France, Britain 
will likely use its five Sentinel aircraft, while France’s contribution remains 
undetermined. The assumption regarding the British position comes from Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, who suggested that 
the soon to be retired fleet of Sentinel aircraft “could be retained through the next 
Strategic Defence and Security Review, planned to conclude during 2015. One possible 
role would be in providing a manned adjunct to NATO’s future Alliance Ground 
Surveillance fleet.”115 Such a move would be understandable given the perceived success 
of Sentinel operations in Afghanistan, Libya, and Mali. 
The French have yet to commit to a platform, but they have made moves to 
acquire UAV capabilities of their own. Following what seems to be an abandonment of 
the British-French initiative, France has worked with Germany, Israel, Italy, and Spain, 
out of a desire for a non-U.S. platform. Nevertheless, France has most recently 
committed to purchasing 12 to 16 U.S. built Medium Altitude Long Endurance MQ-9 
Reapers.116 Whether these will be used as France’s in-kind contribution is unknown. 
Given its advantages and despite its challenges, AGS will provide NATO with 
valuable capabilities. It is, however, a new scope on an aging rifle. While it signals 
progress, AGS is only a piece of a still incomplete capability puzzle. Though the system 
is impressive, few adversaries will be deterred by what are essentially high-flying 
cameras. Only by sustaining “pointy end of the spear” capabilities will NATO remain a 
credible threat. AGS can assist greatly in decision-making, but the decision-makers are 
limited by a shrinking and aging pool of national and collective military assets. At best, 
and with further commitments to additional capabilities by the Allies, AGS will be a 
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force multiplier that makes NATO operations more successful in many ways. At worst, 
AGS cameras might bring NATO’s weaknesses even more in focus.  
D. EVOLUTION OF GROUND SURVEILLANCE PER NATO’S 
STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 
Post-Cold War, as threats and priorities shifted in the Alliance, NATO codified 
the new positions in three separate Strategic Concepts. Issued in 1991, 1999, and 2010, 
these documents worked less as bold new initiatives for Allies to mull over and more as 
reflections of realities already at play. The need for ground surveillance was recognized 
during a transformational time for NATO. Though the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
was accompanied with a corresponding reduction in the Alliance’s need for conventional 
and nuclear forces, the need for robust conventional capabilities remained, and is still 
emphasized today. Events since 1990 have reinforced this reality.  
1. 1991 Strategic Concept 
With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and 
the reunification of Germany, the status quo was not an option for NATO. To sustain the 
Atlantic Alliance, the Allies reaffirmed in the 1991 Strategic Concept that “The Alliance 
is purely defensive in purpose…The role of the Alliance’s military forces is to assure the 
territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to 
peace and stability in Europe.”117 Despite this defensive commitment, a decade-long 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia would soon challenge the purely “defensive in purpose” 
principle. Additionally, the 1991 Strategic Concept, while retaining a significant focus on 
Europe, acknowledged that a non-bipolar world could present the Allies with more 
varied, if smaller, security challenges. 
Though the Allies employed hopeful words for cooperation and dialogue, they 
also resolved to maintain conventional military capabilities. The North Atlantic Council 
declared that “The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve 
the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to 
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prevent war and to provide for effective defence.”118 As part of that effort, NATO’s 
Defense Planning Committee determined in 1992 that ground surveillance was a critical 
capability deficiency, and soon after resolved to get what would later be known as AGS. 
Though AGS would not have been the solution to the Balkan conflicts, the 
troubled breakup of Yugoslavia revealed NATO’s need for improved traditional military 
capabilities. After largely failing to contain Balkan atrocities through 1995—a failure that 
can be credited to insufficient European military forces, commitment, and coordination, 
coupled with American reticence—NATO faced an existential problem. What good was 
NATO in the 1990s if it could not prevent wartime atrocities in Europe? Failing to take 
action on fundamental NATO ideals—the “common values of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law…for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in 
Europe”119—could lead to an ipso facto destruction of a four decade long Atlantic 
partnership.  
In order to maintain its legitimacy as a relevant force in international politics, 
NATO began to more firmly embrace its role in crisis management and peace 
operations—also known as crisis response operations and non-Article 5 operations. Such 
changes required more than robust organizational charts and increased diplomatic 
bureaucracy. While the mechanisms in Brussels were influential, NATO continued to 
recognize conventional force requirements. 
2. 1999 Strategic Concept 
By 1999, NATO recognized its growing sphere of responsibility and how its 
missions had evolved. The Allies explicitly stated, “The Alliance therefore not only 
ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this 
region.”120 NATO actions in the Balkans had by 1999 expanded in an effort to stem 
conflict that had recently required significant NATO force in Kosovo. Acknowledging 
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that instability near NATO was dangerous to Allies, the 1999 Strategic Concept referred 
to NATO’s “commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis 
management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to 
shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic 
area.”121 
In September 2001, for the first time in its history, NATO invoked its Article 5 
commitment, and did so in response to a terrorist attack against the United States. Even 
more importantly, as Steven Erlanger of The New York Times noted, years of indecision 
changed overnight into an acceptance that NATO could need to act globally (though 
many European governments had caveats regarding this change).122 This was reflected in 
changed policies that would be formalized in the 2010 Strategic Concept. In the interim, 
NATO also remained focused on its “cooperative security” agenda, including partnership 
programs and Alliance enlargement, as well as conducting its largest and most 
demanding crisis response operation in Afghanistan. 
Between the 1999 Strategic Concept and its successor in 2010, NATO’s focus 
became somewhat fragmented. Without too much attention to nuance, these concerns 
divide the Allies in roughly three ways. Former Warsaw Pact countries, unwilling to 
return to Russian buffer state status, have focused on collective defense, including 
conventional and nuclear deterrence and defense capabilities. Allies blessed with better 
strategic geography are generally more concerned with improving ties with Russia and 
pursuing non-Russian cooperative security issues. Still others are concerned primarily 
with crisis management contingencies within and beyond Europe.  
3. 2010 Strategic Concept 
At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO published a new strategic concept that 
codified the Alliance’s three “core tasks.” These tasks are cooperative security, crisis 
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management, and collective defense. Unsurprisingly, NATO makes the sweeping but 
entirely plausible claim that AGS supports all of these tasks: “AGS will contribute to 
these three core tasks through using its Swath & Spot Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 
and its Ground Moving Target Indicator capabilities to collect information that will 
provide political and military decision makers with a comprehensive picture of the 
situation on the ground.”123 Nonetheless, this claim is mere political costuming. AGS has 
been dressed up before with current political buzzwords, but NATO’s need for airborne 
ground surveillance existed before Secretary General Rasmussen’s Smart Defense and 
the declarations in Lisbon and Chicago.  
E. PRIORITIZATION OF NATO’S THREE CORE TASKS 
As with any alliance, the NATO Allies have a variety of rationales for their 
membership. These rationales are generalized in the three core tasks, but prioritized 
differently among the Allies. More secure Allies tend to focus on NATO’s expeditionary 
crisis management operations. Less secure Allies tend to focus more on homeland 
defense and NATO’s collective defense mission. Still others tend to focus on cultivating 
“cooperative security” relationships with non-NATO states (especially Russia).  
For some Allies, the missions in Libya and Afghanistan, along with worrying 
instability in Mali and other parts of Africa, reveal a need and provide impetus for 
modernized capabilities. To keep these Allies engaged, the Alliance needs to maintain the 
ability to affect positive outcomes in these conflicts.  AGS is a part of the maintenance of 
this capability. James M. Goldgeier, Dean of the School of International Service at 
American University, points out that the “expeditionary” interest in NATO centers more 
and more on what NATO can do to contain conflicts worldwide. This is in contrast to 
what some Allies view as an outdated notion of simply stabilizing and defending Allies 
Europe. In his view, “Acting as an expeditionary alliance is not secondary to Article V; in 
certain cases today, it is the essence of Article V.”124 
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The fact that many observers in Central and Eastern Europe would take issue with 
Goldgeier’s view illustrates the tension within the Alliance about the proper balance 
among its three core tasks. Accordingly, the sustainment of traditional collective defense 
capabilities is the main concern for Allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Some scholars 
note that these Allies have made strides to improve the conventional force structure of 
Europe by participating in a variety of joint programs that demonstrate a commitment to 
Smart Defense. Marcian Zaborowski and Attila Demkó of the Central European Policy 
Institute conclude that, despite fiscal challenges, “The Central European countries have 
been among the strongest supporters of closer co-operation; they had been buying new 
weapons systems jointly with other allies even before the launch of smart defence.” Two 
major successes include the “Strategic Airlift Capability” and the AGS program. For the 
Strategic Airlift Capability program, the Central and Eastern European states of Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia partnered with the 
Netherlands, Norway, and the U.S. (and Partnership for Peace nations Finland and 
Sweden) to buy three C-17 transport aircraft. For AGS Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are full 
participants.125 
Finally, some Allies’ preeminent goal is improving relations with non-NATO 
states. This primarily involves working with Russia. This presents a special challenge due 
to the general European reliance upon Russia for energy resources, and the nearly 
complete reliance of some Central and Eastern European NATO Allies on Russia in this 
regard.  
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has evolved from a force that defends the 
home front to a force that also acts in support of international security far from home. 
Because NATO AGS fits into both of these roles, it is accepted by all Allies, but national 
interests divide the Alliance into “full contributors” and “partial contributors” to this 
surveillance capability.  
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F. PARTIAL VERSUS FULL CONTRIBUTORS 
In his 2010 paper about NATO’s Article 5 credibility, Pal Jonson divides the 
NATO Allies into three categories: Collective Defenders, Expeditionaries, and Russia 
Firsters.126 These are remarkably similar to NATO’s core tasks as presented in the 2010 
Strategic Concept: Collective Defense, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security. In 
general, and with some considerable overlap, the Collective Defense Allies have tended 
to support AGS more fully, while the Cooperative Security Allies have supported it least. 
Jonson identifies which Allies are in each category.127 While every Ally is 
committed to the three core tasks, each prioritizes them according to its perceived 
security situation. Jonson identifies Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Poland, as 
Collective Defenders while acknowledging that the Czech Republic, Greece, Iceland, 
Slovakia, and Turkey are also generally supportive of this position. These Allies express 
the most concern over territorial defense and focus more on the core task of Collective 
Defense. Jonson’s Expeditionaries are Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. For these states, conflicts outside or on the periphery of 
NATO borders get the most attention. Logically, they prioritize the pursuit of crisis 
management capabilities. Lastly, Jonson’s Russia Firsters include Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. These Allies contrast somewhat with the Collective 
Defenders in how they perceive Russian capabilities and intentions. Whereas Collective 
Defenders wish to show NATO strength in relation to the ex-Soviet Bear, Russia Firsters 
wish to establish better ties. 
When one compares these impressionistic lists against the AGS roster, Collective 
Defenders seem to stand out as most supportive of AGS. Among AGS participants, there 
are really two types: full participants and partial participants. The difference is essentially 
that full participants will cover the purchase and contribute to paying the ongoing costs, 
while partial participants will only contribute to paying the ongoing costs. 
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Full participants include Allies from all three of Jonson’s categories. Collective 
Defenders include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Expeditionaries are Denmark, Luxembourg, 
and the United States, while Russia Firsters Italy and Spain are full participants as well. 
Partial AGS participants span the categories as well, but with more representation 
among non-Collective Defenders. Expeditionaries are Canada, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom; and Russia Firsters are Belgium, France, and Portugal. Finally, 
Collective Defenders include Iceland, Greece, and Turkey as outliers in the partial 
participant list, but these “mismatches” have good reasons for their national positions.  
All Allies supported AGS initially, but when the domestic benefits shrank, the 
general trend was the abandonment of full AGS support by non-Collective Defenders. 
There are many exceptions to this generalization, and each Ally has reasons for its 
national position. Iceland does not maintain a military establishment and had long been 
exempted from the expectation of full participation. Greece’s fiscal difficulties are bleak, 
and Athens is understandably unwilling to make additional spending commitments. As 
reported in the news recently, Turkey has seemingly been disappointed in NATO and is 
even considering non-NATO suppliers such as China for its defense needs. As for the 
outliers Italy and Spain, Italy expects to benefit economically from the basing of AGS in 
Sicily, while Spain wishes to bolster its position in the Alliance by demonstrating its 
ability to pay and play. 
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IV. AGS INSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE IN THE ERA OF 
SMART DEFENSE 
Robert Komer wrote in 1977 that “NATO is a classic alliance of 15 independent 
allies—all largely going their own ways…national, rather than NATO forces are the 
order of the day.”128 Today, NATO is an alliance of 28 independent allies, but Komer’s 
insight has otherwise stood the test of time.  
A. NATO IN CRISIS 
There are many reasons to agree with and to reject the statement above. On one 
hand, politicians and other NATO advocates can point to the Allies’ repeated assertions 
of solidarity and continued dedication to mutual defense. On the other hand, American 
officials have stated that the United States will not endlessly subsidize the defense of a 
continent that should be able to contribute much more to the Alliance’s deterrence and 
defense posture than it has in recent years. At the same time, there is growing worry in 
Europe that the United States will abandon it. While the Allies still depend upon each 
other, evolving threats are shifting American attention elsewhere. Despite the ongoing 
threat of conflict in the Balkans and potential conflicts with Russia, U.S. military 
operations since 2001 have been conducted mainly in the greater Middle East. Moreover, 
in January 2012, the U.S. DoD’s strategic guidance confirmed a change in U.S. force 
posturing in what is widely known as the “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region. This 
guidance states in unusually specific terms that, “while the U.S. military will continue to 
contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific 
region.”129 NATO European Allies have contributed to U.S.-led coalitions as well as 
NATO-led operations in the past, and have even committed to new NATO roles outside 
Europe. Still, reductions in military capabilities are marginalizing European relevance in 
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future conflicts. Not wanting to go it alone, the United States has reason to seek out more 
committed friends in regions where there is more common purpose.  
Commitment is one thing; capabilities are another. In NATO’s case, contributions 
to the Alliance can come in many forms, but goodwill and yesterday’s exertions seem not 
to offset today’s rapidly vanishing military capabilities. As shrinking military budgets 
and capabilities become the norm, Canada and the European Allies need to give the 
United States a reason to remain committed to NATO. While U.S. attention is shifting 
away from NATO, shortcomings in national and European Union (EU) defense 
capabilities tie Europe to a NATO that is seemingly more and more reliant upon U.S. 
contributions. Claudia Major, Christian Mölling, and Tomas Valasek, experts in Smart 
Defense, state that, “Ideally, NATO’s European allies should be increasing or at least 
maintaining military strength to respond to U.S. retrenchment. Instead, they are cutting 
furiously to cope with the economic crisis.”130  Attempting to sustain multi-national 
efforts, initiatives like NATO’s Smart Defense (SD) and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing 
(P&S) beseech partner states to spend more efficiently together in order to remain as 
relevant as possible in times of austerity. So far, these programs have shown very little 
ability to achieve their goals. 
While SD and P&S advocates laud AGS as a successful example, “most new 
collaborative projects are far more trifling and cover areas such as military education and 
human resources.”131 While it is difficult to argue against successful money saving SD 
programs, their impact has thus far been insufficient. Michael Rühle argues that planned 
SD projects “could potentially save European nations a few hundred million euros, yet 
the budget cuts since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 amount to more than 30 
billion euros.”132 Professor David Yost warns that the growing imbalance between U.S. 
and Allied capabilities “could become politically debilitating” for the Alliance as it could 
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breed resentment in Europe and disdain in the United States.133 French SD expert 
Camille Grand states the problem more pointedly, if less diplomatically: “European 
countries are continuing to be free riders, instead of working seriously to see how to act 
together.”134  
The lack of seriousness is possible because Allies are complacent and feel 
relatively secure, but this feeling of security comes cheaply for Europeans, and 
expensively for Americans. Perhaps these sharing programs should be recast not as 
efficiency measures, but as the cost of sustaining the Alliance, which is the mechanism 
providing the current sense of security. NATO Defence College intern Giulia Roccia 
states in her paper that NATO cannot radically shift the self-interested behaviors of 
Allies, but that it can encourage better coordination to show why cooperation is in an 
Ally’s long term interest, even when short term interests dictate otherwise. 135 Her 
argument is only partially correct. NATO could do a better job of advocating multi-lateral 
efforts, but better management of shrinking capabilities is insufficient. Champions of the 
Alliance must do a better job of showing its member states that SD programs keep bigger 
Allies (especially Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) interested in the 
Alliance and that cooperation sustains the relevance of smaller Allies. AGS is a small but 
noteworthy part of the solutions required to address this seemingly insurmountable 
NATO problem.  
This chapter discusses efforts to bolster European participation in NATO in the 
forms of P&S and SD, reviews potential AGS outcomes, and demonstrates that current 
SD outcomes are grossly inadequate. The chapter nonetheless suggests that AGS might 
point toward an evolution in SD—perhaps it could be called “pragmatic defense”?—that 
could bring efficiencies and savings, but also recognize the value of less than ideal 
bargains in sustaining relationships. 
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B. PARALLEL EFFORTS: SMART DEFENSE AND POOLING AND 
SHARING 
1. Pooling and Sharing 
As relevant military capabilities evolve, some NATO Allies are having a hard 
time keeping up. Since capabilities are the metric against which militaries are ultimately 
measured, many experts and officials worry about how they are shrinking for all NATO 
Allies. In Europe, this is a continuation of policies and budget choices that began with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. For the North American Allies, the change is more 
nuanced, but recent budgetary pressures are forcing cuts as well. To lessen the impact of 
smaller budgets, states have notionally embraced the idea of partnering with allies to 
maximize (or at least increase) the efficiency of their defense spending. While these 
programs have had varying levels of success, multilateral actions undertaken with the 
United States seem to work better than multilateral efforts that exclude the United States.  
Stephen Hadley, former National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush, 
has stated that, although European officials sound upbeat when discussing the 
transatlantic relationship, they fail to acknowledge the shortcomings. In his view, 
“Europe has become so enamored with soft power that it has stopped investing in hard 
power…[I]n terms of hard security, it makes Europe a free rider.”136 Since the end of the 
Cold War, some European elites have embraced the idea that the European Union could 
effectively employ soft power. In this, the EU has been generally successful. Alongside 
this effort—and perhaps, in part, because of this focus—attempts to organize hard power 
without the United States and within an EU context have largely fallen short of their 
original targets. Efforts to remain a meaningful partner of the United States by 
strengthening the European portion of NATO have also failed to gain the initially desired 
robustness due to declining domestic will along with shrinking national defense budgets.  
Numerous efforts—such as the EU Battlegroups, the French-German brigade, and 
the entirety of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)—have achieved some 
of what they set out to accomplish, but these oft-celebrated institutions have yielded little 
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in terms of actual combat capability. Tomas Valasek, Permanent Representative of the 
Slovak Republic to NATO, notes that these programs started out with high expectations 
and enthusiasm, but their anemic outcomes have “given military cooperation a bad 
name.”137 Reflecting the problem of focusing on discussion over action in the EU’s 
“pooling and sharing” initiative, Christian Mölling states that “the initiatives launched to 
date have not been particularly successful,” and that “Europe is running the risk of 
talking to death another sensible option for maintaining its defence capability.”138 
Though played down by those in charge, failures to attain significant outcomes in 
joint EU activities can be equated with wasting opportunities to retain power and 
influence.  This can be seen, however, as perfectly rational from a state perspective. 
Retaining absolute (though shrinking) state authority today instead of trading it for the 
promise of a portion of an (also shrinking, but more relevant) EU authority tomorrow 
makes perfect sense to many national leaders.  
Jolyon Howorth has suggested that EU elites are divided between those who 
accept that “nation-states are no longer the only actors in the international system” and 
those who “have a vested interest in pretending that the rules of the game remain the 
same.” For Howorth, the formation of a strategic EU context is not just pragmatic, it is 
essential for the European Union’s relevance in the world of tomorrow. As Howorth has 
observed, “The EU’s assets will all have declined, at least relatively, against her main 
competitors… [so] the refusal to make collective EU choices in the world of 2025 will be 
tantamount to an abdication of sovereignty.”139 Mölling refers to the retention of state 
authorities throughout Europe—even for Britain and France—as a “false kind of 
sovereignty.” In his view, “No European country is strong enough anymore to go it 
alone.”140 Nevertheless, the CSDP’s ambitious call for transitioning to joint capability 
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acquisitions has been criticized by some observers as more paperwork than practice, and 
the challenge of further transitioning European sovereignty from the state to actual EU 
authorities remains. 
There are currently several functioning P&S programs, and the European Defense 
Agency (EDA) has identified many other areas for development. The EDA’s P&S 
factsheet lists those programs already enacted or identified as necessary: Helicopter 
Training, Maritime Surveillance, Pilot Training, Smart Munitions, Transportation Hubs, 
Naval Logistics and Training, Space and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) capabilities, and Field Hospitals.141  Many of these stated goals were an outcome 
of deficiencies identified in the Libya operation. Hoping to improve European 
preparedness in future conflicts, European defense leaders are trying to master these 
issues quickly. In theory, P&S initiatives are identified and promoted by EDA steering 
committees. It is hoped that this method will maximize efficiencies by streamlining the 
process. 
Though P&S has thus far pursued less ambitious programs than NATO AGS, it 
has its own distinct strengths and shortcomings. Though more limited due to the 
exclusion of the United States and Canada (and more importantly, the U.S. and Canadian 
defense budgets), P&S enjoys the advantage of more limited goals and legitimacy 
derived from being a European program that benefits Europeans. Sub-regional groupings 
like the Central European, Nordic, Baltic, Benelux, and Visegrad states, along with the 
France/UK alliance have been successful at promoting cooperation that could not be 
effected through the more cumbersome EU or NATO frameworks. As the EU further 
establishes its CSDP through the EDA, changing P&S from exception to norm seems 
imperative. 
2. Smart Defense: Smarter Concept Needed 
Strategic planners have long bemoaned the inefficiencies that accompanied 
NATO member states’ military organization, but they seem to have consistently been 
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committed to overcoming them. In 1949, NATO’s strategic concept advocated, but 
always with caveats, “to develop a maximum of strength through collective defense 
planning.” This was further defined as calling for standardization of military 
maintenance, equipment, and procedures. Further hints of what would later be known as 
SD are seen in the commitment to “cooperation…in research and development of new 
weapons.”142  In 1977, Robert Komer recognized the Warsaw Pact’s seeming advantage 
in military efficiencies that came from lower troop costs and centralized control from 
Moscow. He proposed a “rationalization” of NATO defense. In an eyebrow raising 
parallel to SD, Komer predicted that deterring the Warsaw Pact would be impossible 
given budgetary constraints unless NATO members could overcome “national 
particularism” and adopt the concepts of rationalization.143 This goal of unified efforts 
would last through the end of the Cold War. Thirty-seven years later, not much has 
changed, and efforts to make NATO spending smarter are still in the works. 
Smart Defense, the modern day incarnation of NATO teamwork, was born in 
2011. As a purposefully vague concept, it can be described, but not easily defined. 
Popularized by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, SD is a concept that 
“can help nations build greater security with fewer resources…so that together we can 
avoid the financial crisis from becoming a security crisis.”144 This new mindset has been 
routinely celebrated in NATO speeches and policy documents since Rasmussen’s speech, 
but has not caught on much beyond that. Longstanding multi-national NATO activities 
such as the previously discussed NATO AWACS program, and commonly funded NATO 
command systems, airfields, and pipelines have been recast as examples of SD, but the 
concept still remains hollow for the same reasons that national assets are considered 
advantageous. From an individual Ally’s perspective, “un-smart” defense may make 
significantly more sense than what some SD advocates prescribe. Allies whose militaries 
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are organized with national goals in mind can—among other things—maximize benefits 
to domestic industries and focus to a greater extent on national defense priorities. 
Because of this, national assets and unilateral defense acquisitions continue to 
predominate. In theory, a modern, large, and relevant AGS program could be a catalyst 
that furnishes the rationale for embracing Smart Defense.  
Some academics point to AGS as a “flagship” SD program, but the significance of 
AGS as the model (or template) for future SD programs is somewhat dubious. 
Nevertheless, a collapse of the AGS program could have a markedly negative effect on 
future cooperative efforts. Given the political and strategic environment in which NATO 
operates, such a failure could have significant consequences for the alliance. It could also 
give ammunition to those who question its future ability to carry out even its Article 5 
collective defense commitments, let alone its newer, more ambitious and continuing 
crisis management operations and cooperative security activities. 
3. Teamwork: Blending SD and P&S 
Smart Defense is an initiative remarkably similar to the European Union’s 
Pooling and Sharing (P&S) concept. Christened in 2010, one year before SD, P&S is an 
equally vague concept that advocates hope will allow European Union states to sustain 
and build defense capabilities despite shrinking military budgets.145 There will likely be 
growing pains associated with blending what the Zurich-based Center for Security 
Studies calls “Smart Pooling”  between the EU and NATO, but continuously improving 
efficiencies at any level will further NATO’s SD goals.146 
Both SD and P&S aim to increase efficiencies by streamlining processes, but this 
shared aim contributes to the weakness of both ideas. Though small groups of states and 
individual states are taking actions consistent with SD and P&S, these actors only select 
programs and policies that are clearly and quickly advantageous. This significantly limits 
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the scope of the projects undertaken and makes large scale programs like AGS extremely 
difficult to initiate. Though P&S has had worthwhile successes (training missions, field 
hospitals, common munitions, etc.), there is little sign that the EU will be able to jointly 
acquire its stated major capability goals (like space, ISR, and air to air refueling 
assets).147  
The November 2010 UK-France Defence Cooperation Treaty, discussed briefly in 
Chapter 3, looked promising. It committed the nations to cooperate on a variety of 
projects, but the signature projects remain mostly conceptual. According to some 
commentators, even if these bilateral and multilateral projects come to fruition, the 
resulting assets would be unacceptably constrained by the veto power of participating 
states. Coalitions of two are cumbersome, and larger partnerships introduce further 
coordination challenges. The same phenomenon undermines SD and P&S programs. This 
in turn leads many Allies to continue to rely upon national assets. 
4. AGS and Smart Defense: Which Defines Which? 
While Smart Defense is an ideal, it is not new, nor is it a driver of change. Since 
1949, NATO’s track record on Smart Defense has been fairly consistent. Although Allies 
routinely express commitment to efficiencies and make conceptual promises about 
working together, SD successes remain fortuitous exceptions rather than drivers of joint 
action. This is largely because “smart” is a relative concept. Key to the success of any SD 
program is the idea that it is advantageous for all parties involved. Examples of these 
programs are limited, and even these require a great deal of negotiations to ensure equal 
“smartness.” Though there are many indirect pressures at play, NATO Allies maintain 
little coercive power over each other. Building compelling programs that interest all 
Allies while simultaneously making everyone feel like a winner is a difficult art to 
perfect. Proponents of SD and P&S use flagship programs like AGS to celebrate the 
advantages of teamwork, but these flagships of cooperation are of limited use as SD 
models.  
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Headline programs like AGS and AWACS are special cases that evolved from 
unique circumstances. NATO AWACS was not a success simply because it aligned with 
a mindset that encouraged teamwork. It carries the “smart” moniker today because, to 
deal with Soviet strike threats, AWACS aircraft were an efficient alternative to a 
significant increase in fighter air patrols. AWACS was sold on the concept that, despite 
its expense, it would save money by more efficiently defending against a significant 
common threat.148 The United States shouldered much of its cost because it valued the 
capability enough to subsidize the Alliance’s defense posture, reduce the costs of its own 
E-3s, and aid its own industry.  Today’s AGS program has a similar if somewhat less 
convincing rationale for Europe—that NATO should not be so reliant upon U.S. assets, 
and that acquisition of a ground surveillance capability may save the lives of European 
troops in future conflicts.149 Because the AGS case is not as compelling as the AWACS 
case, consensus took much longer to attain, and the end result was more limited. In any 
case, the unique attributes of AWACS and AGS make them imperfect models for other 
SD initiatives. They do, however, reveal something important. 
While there exists the potential for major NATO joint acquisitions in the future—
aerial tankers and satellites come to mind—these major acquisitions cannot achieve the 
overall savings, sustenance, and development of capabilities that SD envisions. A 
successful AGS program would benefit Allies because it would give NATO a much 
needed capability.  This success, however, would make no more than a dent in the 
systemic budgetary and organizational issues that threaten NATO’s ability to conduct 
combat operations. In order to meet the stated goals of SD, NATO needs vastly more 
smart programs than the 20 announced in Chicago in May 2012.  
The majority of the public commentary that provides guidance for how to 
implement SD is flawed. The arguments fail for at least three reasons.  
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The first is that “Smart Defense” is nearly impossible to argue against generally, 
but impossible to enact without paying attention to smallest details. While “the devil is in 
the details” is an overused idiom, the shoe seems to fit. 
The second is that critical details of potential SD programs are not openly 
discussed. Prescriptions found in the academic literature hold forth at length with 
plausible ideas about what Smart Defense should and should not do, but are usually too 
general to be useful. Statements like “NATO should therefore promote Smart Defence 
with a practical and prudent approach,”150 the “initiative still needs to be more accurately 
defined in the longer term,”151 and that “Smart Defense should be focused in three 
areas…residual force…core force…and Force 2020”152 may spur limited action, but they 
do not seem likely to motivate the bold initiatives envisioned by NATO leaders. The 
NATO Allies have never accepted procurement deals that are inconsistent with their 
perceived interests. It is hard to imagine that SD will change this pattern, but Allied 
interests may need to be reassessed. 
A third (though certainly not final) reason for viewing SD as flawed is that few 
acknowledge the issues associated with Allies finding solutions to capabilities issues 
outside NATO. Instead of worrying about the loss of capabilities in general, NATO 
leaders would be wise to further consider what Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer 
acknowledge is “an increasing preeminence of bilateral defense relationships between 
Allies and Washington.”153 It is easy to imagine a future in which the United States 
chooses to partner with select Allies in order to circumvent the cumbersome NATO 
process and contrary voices in the Alliance. Recent examples include American deals 
with Poland and Romania. In Poland, the United States made “a significant commitment 
of aircraft, time, and personnel to the bilateral relationship” by establishing a permanent 
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operational detachment at Lask Air Base.154 In the near term, this detachment will 
support annual aerial fighter and transport exercises. The bilateral U.S.-Romanian 
relationship has seemingly warmed as well. Romania recently purchased U.S. anti-
ballistic missiles (to be operational by 2015) and is assisting U.S. drawdown efforts in 
Afghanistan by allowing the U.S. military temporary use of Kogalniceanu air base.155 
This phenomenon is not limited to bilateral ties with the United States. Recent 
dealings between Turkey and China regarding missile defense systems and defense 
equipment deals involving France, Germany, and Russia demonstrate that interests 
outside NATO may outweigh intra-Alliance solidarity. As these different bilateral 
relationships grow, it is conceivable that a future adversary could use the resultant 
divisions in NATO to its advantage. Because the strength of any alliance is dependent 
upon unity, the growing tendency to form bilateral relations should be viewed as an 
ominous sign by NATO supporters.  
C. INTERESTS REDEFINED? 
Today, Allies participate in joint acquisitions because they see a value in doing 
so. But this value is a particularly relative concept, and subject to redefinition by specific 
Allies. For some, value can come in the form of obtaining a shared capability and/or from 
economic benefits associated with participation. At one extreme, with states that are truly 
concerned with security, an acquired capability may be sufficient to justify a substantial 
cost. At the other extreme, states that consider themselves secure may only be willing to 
participate in joint ventures if they have economic incentives to do so. For these states, if 
such incentives are taken away, the reason for participation disappears. When these two 
motivations clash, goodwill among Allies can be lost; yet this dynamic is nothing new.  
As Michael Rühle has suggested, many Allies today view SD as a preferred 
method for reinforcing the transatlantic tether. Instead of limiting AGS to an envisioned 
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acquired capability or regarding it as an economic boon, these Allies seem to view 
participation as an attempt to remain relevant to NATO and to sustain the Alliance’s 
cohesion. When looking for value in defense spending, few projects could compare to 
securing an element of NATO’s Article 5 protection. By this measure, joint acquisitions 
like AGS are an extremely efficient use of state funds spent for military defense.  
By committing their territory and a relative pittance in support of larger Allies’ 
projects, smaller Allies are able to maintain a voice and sustain the security assurances of 
the most powerful Alliance in the world. In other words, today’s joint NATO acquisitions 
may be pursued for reasons in addition to commitment to an amorphous procurement 
efficiency goal. These less than obvious considerations could be at the heart of a 
redefined and reinvigorated SD. 
Instead of simply stating their dedication to NATO’s principles as expressed in 
the Strategic Concepts, Allies could view future AEW and AGS type projects as 
opportunities for Allies to demonstrate their commitment to each other. Smart Defense is, 
in its current form, a disappointment. The rhetoric of its proponents has implied that, 
through efficiencies that are in everyone’s interest, capabilities can be successfully 
sustained despite budget cutbacks. Not surprisingly, this happy promise applies to very 
few capabilities and begets projects like AGS that fall short of their original goals. It 
might be more accurate to say that effective Smart Defense projects should necessarily be 
unequal or favor certain Allies as a way to cover the real costs associated with being in an 
Alliance. As NATO’s strategic interests shift outside of Europe, such unequal burden 
sharing by smaller and/or less prosperous Allies would help mitigate the longstanding 
“free-rider” problem. For many of these less influential Allies, the primary interest in 
joint acquisitions is not securing a financially advantageous deal. The acquisitions may 
instead be undertaken as a meaningful way to remain relevant to the Alliance and to 
uphold its political cohesion. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Today, AGS is NATO’s most prominent joint acquisition program. By 2017, it 
will provide the Alliance with a fully operational and shared aerial ground surveillance 
capability. The Global Hawk system upon which AGS is based has had a significant 
amount of bad publicity, especially in regard to the Euro Hawk and U.S. Air Force Block 
30 variants. More recently, however, the platform’s fortunes have improved. Non-NATO 
U.S. Allies (including Japan and South Korea) have committed to purchase Global 
Hawks, and AGS appears to be on track per the 2012 Chicago Summit commitment. 
Aside from its role as surveillance platform, some analysts have suggested that 
AGS is a model or “flagship” program for NATO’s Smart Defense (SD) initiative. In a 
sense, these voices may be correct. AGS will improve NATO’s ISR capabilities—which 
have been repeatedly criticized as deficient—while employing a measure of Smart 
Defense-type burden sharing. In this vein, AGS is similar to NATO’s preceding large-
scale joint acquisition of 18 AWACS aircraft.  Nevertheless, it is far from clear that 
future SD projects will be inspired by the demonstrated efficiencies of AGS once the 
capabilities are employed operationally.  
The end of the Cold War signaled fundamental changes in Alliance policy, which 
have been reflected in the Strategic Concepts of 1991, 1999, and 2010. Despite the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Allies continue to reaffirm their unanimous 
commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty, especially regarding their “collective defense” 
obligations under Article 5. Still, three distinct groups have emerged that emphasize 
different security priorities. These are codified in the 2010 Strategic Concept as the “core 
tasks” of “collective defense,” “crisis management,” and “cooperative security.” Every 
Ally agrees that the each core task is vital, but Allies differ on the rank order priority. 
This prioritization trifurcation exacerbates the perpetual concern over fair burden-sharing. 
AGS is advertised as useful for each of the core tasks, but selective participation 
in footing the $1.8 billion acquisition bill suggests otherwise. AGS was initially 
envisioned as a much larger acquisition. Changes in budgets, strategy, and perceived 
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national benefits diminished both the size of the program and the cast of full AGS 
participants. Using Swedish expert Pal Jonson’s model,156 the Allies that are most 
concerned with protecting territorial integrity—Jonson’s Collective Defenders—seem to 
be the most willing full AGS participants. The Allies that are more concerned with out of 
area crisis management operations (Expeditionaries), that are focused on improving 
relations with partner states (Russia Firsters), or that do not gain a significant economic 
boost from AGS are less likely to contribute to the AGS acquisition. 
Perhaps acknowledging its measured success, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
alluded to AGS as a “critical symbol” whose failure would undercut future joint 
capability development projects.157 This is probably true; however, this implies that a 
successful AGS would have the opposite effect. While AGS may advance the SD concept 
generally, the program has suffered too many setbacks and delays to be a model of 
efficiency in joint acquisitions. However, if the Allies accept a new SD paradigm that 
recognizes the critical importance of sustaining NATO’s political cohesion without 
neglecting the need for efficiently acquired and operationally relevant capabilities, AGS 
will be a success worth repeating.  
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